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Executive Summary 
 
In the midst of all the foreclosures sweeping the country, and the turmoil on Wall Street, nonprofit 
housing organizations are quietly going about the work of stabilizing communities hard hit by the 
crisis. Most have had frontline responsibility for counseling families threatened with foreclosure. 
With their assistance tens of thousands of families have restructured their budgets, negotiated with 
servicers to modify their loans, and saved their homes. Other families, too far along in the 
foreclosure process to stop it from happening, have received help transitioning to new housing 
arrangements. 
 
While the work with distressed homeowners must continue, nonprofits are feeling increased 
pressure to deal with the growing foreclosed housing stock. These units are causing incalculable 
harm to neighborhoods, and any hope of housing recovery must ensure that these units are swiftly 
put back into productive use or demolished. This collection of 14 case studies outlines strategies 
that nonprofit organizations across the country are using to begin the process of repairing damaged 
communities. 
 
The stakes are enormous. Vacant housing invites vandalism, and becomes a hub for gangs and 
crime. Virtually all case study subjects reported that, within weeks of housing becoming vacant, 
thieves break into the units and strip them of their valuable copper plumbing and wiring, heedless of 
any destruction they leave in their wake. In Phoenix a half-finished, abandoned subdivision was 
used as an informal “Home Depot” as other homeowners broke in and helped themselves to fixtures 
and appliances. In Cleveland, vandals remove not just the copper but the aluminum siding from 
vacant houses. In photos these houses have a desolate, post-disaster look, like the aftermath of a 
hurricane. When units get demolished the vacant lots soon sprout grass and trash, adding to the 
community’s forlorn appearance. 
 
Vacant, deteriorated units place a downward pressure on housing values that puts nearby neighbors 
in a bind. In order to sell their units they will have to reduce the price, as no one will pay top dollar 
to live in a blighted neighborhood. Yet their ability to refinance into a more affordable mortgage 
may be compromised by the drop in property values; in some cases this leads to additional 
foreclosures and the downward cycle continues. 
 
Intervening in these troubled neighborhoods is challenging. In some markets housing prices are still 
falling, making it hard to determine the value of the units. Bank asset managers and servicers often 
lack detailed knowledge of the markets, or even of the units they have in their own inventory. This 
leads them to overvalue their properties and hold out for more than they are worth, delaying the 
process of acquiring and renovating them for resale to new homebuyers. Finally, the complex 
ownership structure of mortgages which were rolled into collateralized debt obligations and other 
investment vehicles makes it very difficult to establish who owns properties and who has authority 
to negotiate their sale.  
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Despite these challenges the following case studies illustrate that there is much reason for optimism 
amidst the financial gloom. In the roughly 15-20 years since the last national housing crisis 
nonprofit community development corporations (CDCs) have made enormous strides. There are 
more of them. They are larger, more sophisticated, and have more financial tools at their disposal, 
including the New Market Tax Credits program and the Community Development Financial 
Institution (CDFI) Fund administered by the US Department of Treasury. They have established 
impressive track records, developing or acquiring hundreds of rental units and loan portfolios worth 
tens of millions of dollars. Significantly, their delinquency rates are an enviable five percent or less 
because they used careful underwriting criteria and required pre-purchase homebuyer education. 
 
By themselves, through intermediaries, or through regional public-private partnerships they have 
the ability to participate in the sort of large scale solutions that will be required to restore 
neighborhood housing markets to equilibrium. Table A below provides an estimate of the 13 subject 
organizations’ planned redevelopment of foreclosed housing units in the next three years. This chart 
likely underestimates their total production, as it includes just those strategies featured in the case 
studies. Many have other programs they will also use to redevelop foreclosed inventory. These 
projections also represent a best guess at this point in time, but with the continued volatility of the 
housing markets they may change from year to year. Nevertheless, Table A provides some insight 
into the impact this handful of nonprofits will have, as well as their estimated capital needs. 
 
Table A: Projected Redevelopment of Foreclosed Housing Units over Three Years * 
 
 
3-Year Plan  
Foreclosed Housing  
(Featured Strategy Only) 
 
Capital Required 
NHS of Phoenix 48 $6 million 
Beyond Housing 150 $6 million 
Neighborhood Progress, Inc. 450 $18 million 
Columbus Housing Partnership 125 $15 million 
NHS of Chicago- Receivership 450 $3.9 million 
City First Enterprises 200 $15 million  
Self-Help 200 $20 million 
Dayton's Bluff 500 $72.2 million 
United Housing 100 $8 million 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center 105 $12.6 million 
Chelsea Neighborhood Developers 90 2.7 million 
CAPC/HAND 1,000 $150 million 
LA  NHS 900 $7 million 
NHS of Chicago- Organizing N/A N/A 
TOTAL 4,318 $336.4 million 
* These estimates apply to the strategy featured in the case study only, and do not include other community stabilization 
activities the organization may also be implementing. 
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The groups represented here have evolved different strategies that respond to the needs of their local 
markets. This only makes sense, as Dr. Phyllis Betts of University of Memphis points out in United 
Housing’s case study. She notes that just as individuals take different paths to foreclosure and 
require different solutions, so communities and markets vary, and strategies that are highly effective 
in some markets may not work in others. While these case studies model strategies that have proven 
successful or appear very promising, efforts to replicate them must take into consideration the local 
context in which they originated and include an evaluation of whether they make sense in another 
location. 
 
Accordingly, the 14 case studies, representing 13 different nonprofit organizations, are loosely 
grouped by market characteristics as follows: 
 
1. Former “hot” markets in strong economies that experienced rapid escalation in housing prices 
followed by sharp declines. These markets were more likely to see high use of “exotic” 
subprime mortgage instruments as both homebuyers and speculators sought to buy into, and 
benefit from, overheated markets.  
 
2. More moderate housing markets in cities where the underlying economy was strong. These 
markets did not see huge price increases, but instead more use of subprime refinancing that 
stripped equity from homeowners. 
 
3. Strong housing markets in cities where the underlying economy was struggling, making 
recovery from the collapse of the housing market that much more challenging. 
 
4. Cities in which neither the housing market nor the underlying economy was particularly 
overheated in the last 5-7 years. 
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Housing Market 
 
 
Hot                                                                           Moderate to Weak 
 
1. 
• NHS of Phoenix 
• City First Enterprises 
• Dayton's Bluff 
• LA - NHS 
• NHS of NYC 
 
 
2. 
• NHS of Chicago 
 
  Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Weak 
 
3. 
• Chelsea Neighborhood 
Developers 
• HAND/CAPC 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
• Beyond Housing 
• Neighborhood Progress, Inc. 
• Columbus Housing Partnership 
• United Housing  
• St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center 
Note: Self-Help is omitted from this matrix because it is available nationally. 
 
 
Admittedly this is a simplistic approach to sorting out the case studies. Even within these cities 
some neighborhood housing markets and economies would have been stronger than others, and 
regardless of how strong it was three or four years ago nearly every city is struggling now. 
Strategies and innovations that have emerged in some markets may in fact work well in others that 
are less similar. Finally, these strategies have also emerged from the expertise and experience of the 
nonprofit organization, its partners, and the availability of resources. These factors will influence 
local decisions about which community stabilization strategies to implement. This matrix is meant 
as a starting point, so that readers can begin with markets that most resemble their own, and move 
outward from there.  
 
The types of strategies examined in these case studies can be grouped under the following headings:   
 
1. Expanding Access to Capital 
• City First Enterprises (Washington DC) pioneers use of the New Markets Tax Credit to help 
create permanently affordable workforce housing. 
• Columbus Housing Partnership (Columbus OH) uses the New Markets Tax Credit to 
support extensive redevelopment in neighborhoods, and to acquire and renovate foreclosed 
units in scattered sites. 
• St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center (Baltimore, MD) uses HUD’s Asset Control Area program 
to turn FHA foreclosures into solid, energy efficient, single-family homes. 
E
co
no
m
y 
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• Self-Help (National) has created a secondary market using a Fannie Mae product to buy 
lease-purchase loans from nonprofit housing groups that want to fill vacant single-family 
units but need time to help tenants qualify for conventional financing.  
 
2. Bulk Acquisition of Distressed or REO Inventory 
• HANDS Inc. (Orange NJ) helps create a new intermediary, the Community Asset 
Preservation Corporation (CAPC), to negotiate with lenders and servicers for bulk 
acquisition of distressed assets and REO. 
• Neighborhood Housing Services of Phoenix (Phoenix AZ) acquired a half-built subdivision 
at foreclosure sale at a pre-negotiated price, and hopes to acquire other distressed or 
foreclosed subdivisions using a similar model.  
 
3. Strategic Interventions Grounded in Neighborhood Plans 
• Chelsea Neighborhood Developers, Inc. (Chelsea MA) is making strategic decisions on 
which foreclosed units to purchase based on detailed neighborhood planning and work with 
residents that will protect and build on existing community assets. 
• Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, Inc. (Chicago IL) went back to old-style 
organizing techniques to learn about the impacts of foreclosure in a target neighborhood, 
and worked with the venerable St. Nicholas Church to improve outreach to at-risk 
homeowners. 
• Neighborhood Progress, Inc. (Cleveland, OH) implements a pilot to acquire, renovate, and 
re-sell foreclosed inventory, and create a foreclosure “early warning system”  in six 
neighborhoods that had already completed targeted revitalization plans.  
 
4. Strengthening Neighborhoods through Strengthening Families 
• Beyond Housing (St. Louis MO) uses an established model of acquiring and renovating 
distressed inventory for its own rental portfolio; units are rented to low-income families who 
are provided an array of other services and supports to strengthen their tenancies. 
• Los Angeles Neighborhood Housing Services (Los Angeles CA) provides an array of 
services to help families facing foreclosure get in touch with servicers, learn about their 
options, and make a respectful transition to new housing. 
 
5. Forming Partnerships to Improve Access to Technical Assistance, Capital, and Distressed 
Housing Inventory 
• Dayton’s Bluff (St. Paul MN) participates in a variety of local and regional partnerships that 
will help it access the technical assistance, capital, and bulk purchase of foreclosed housing 
inventory it will need in order to stabilize neighborhoods. 
• Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago (Chicago IL) partners with the City of 
Chicago’s Code Enforcement office and the district courts to serve as receiver for 
deteriorated properties that have been referred to the City’s Demolition Court. 
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• United Housing (Memphis TN) is partnering with the University of Memphis and local 
organizations to help plan and implement stabilization activities that are strategically 
directed to the neighborhood culture, market and needs. 
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Successful community revitalization 
requires resident input and good 
data; in Pagedale, Beyond Housing 
conducted surveys, focus groups, 
and stakeholder interviews to lay 
the foundation for a community 
plan. 
Beyond Housing’s Comprehensive Revitalization Approach Stabilizes Families, 
Neighborhoods 
 
Housing Prices Stable, Subprime Lending/Increased Foreclosures in Areas of Economic 
Decline 
 
Pagedale is a blue collar, post-war community located in northern St. Louis County just outside of 
St. Louis. In this area, from 36 to 54 percent of mortgage loans originated for home purchase and 
refinance in 2004 were subprime loans and the payments are coming due. Not a thriving economy 
to begin with, Pagedale is struggling with an increase in foreclosures, but these days it is getting an 
extra boost from Beyond Housing.  
 
Beyond Housing is a NeighborWorks® Organization located in St. Louis with a mission to 
“strengthen neighborhoods, one family at a time.” It takes its family focus seriously, providing them 
with a comprehensive array of educational, employment, youth development and other support 
services in addition to housing assistance. It also works to identify and nurture resident leadership in 
its target communities. 
 
“Pagedale is a community of about 3,600 residents that in 2002, when we started working there, had 
an unemployment rate of 29 percent,” recalls Chris Krehmeyer, Beyond Housing’s Executive 
Director. “It was really headed in the wrong direction.” The city initially requested help with new 
housing construction, but after Krehmeyer took a look he advocated for a more comprehensive 
approach.  
 
Sound community revitalization starts with good data and 
resident input, so Beyond Housing staff and Pagedale 
began with a series of surveys, focus groups, and 
stakeholder interviews to identify assets and weaknesses 
and gather input on resident priorities. The plan that 
emerged from this phase focused on improving the housing 
stock, strengthening services, building community 
leadership, and attracting new business investment.  
 
 
Six years later, Pagedale is a very different community. Beyond Housing has built 90 new homes, 
renovated 12, and provided grants to over 100 seniors to help them with home repairs. It has helped 
organize multiple volunteer efforts to help homeowners with limited incomes fix up dilapidated 
homes. Krehmeyer estimates that in one way or another Beyond Housing has touched 20 percent of 
the homes in Pagedale. In a recent follow-up survey, the number of homes in good condition 
jumped from 40 to 80 percent. The newly formed Pagedale Community Association helps to attract, 
organize, and train neighborhood volunteers to continue the work going forward. With Beyond 
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Purchasing foreclosed single-family 
units and retaining them in its rental 
portfolio will allow Beyond Housing 
both to protect its existing units, and 
expand its capacity to assist single-
parent families in need of intensive 
supports to ensure their long term 
success. 
Housing’s help, residents have attended NeighborWorks® Training Institutes to hone their 
leadership skills and gather new ideas for local projects. 
 
Improving the housing stock is just part of the story, however. As its name and its mission suggest, 
Beyond Housing is committed to strengthening families. Another major focus of the Pagedale 
revitalization effort has been the creation of the Pagedale Family Support Center, which provides a 
range of services year-round. Recreation teams and after school activities serve over 1,000 youth 
annually. The Center also offers computer labs, a food pantry, and a variety of programs aimed at 
seniors.  
 
The final piece of the plan is to attract more economic development. Beyond Housing has worked 
with the city of Pagedale to create a community development plan for a tax increment financing 
district (TIF). Plans are underway to open a new, 16,000 SF grocery store, with other new stores to 
follow. With Pagedale a much stronger community than it was six years ago, Krehmeyer is looking 
to replicate this model to revitalize a much larger area included within the Normandy School 
District (population 10,000).  
 
Krehmeyer sees that Pagedale’s positive momentum has been threatened by the foreclosure crisis. 
Twice they have distributed door knockers informing residents about the Homeowner’s HOPE 
hotline, but they still see homes lost to foreclosure.  
 
To fill the vacant units Krehmeyer will turn to another 
strategy Beyond Housing has been perfecting over many 
years. The organization currently owns 240 single family 
homes, scattered in 23 communities through St. Louis 
County. The houses are rented to single parent families. 
In addition to the subsidized rents, families receive help 
establishing long-term goals related to education, 
employment and homeownership. Beyond Housing staff 
connects families with a comprehensive array of 
educational, employment, youth development, and other 
support services to help them achieve these goals. A key asset building strategy for many families is 
an Individual Development Account (IDA) that matches their savings. Families average about five 
years in this program, and at the end of it are frequently able to move on to homeownership or other 
goals. 
 
Beyond Housing’s lengthy experience with this service-enriched, scattered-site rental approach 
makes it the right tool for stabilizing neighborhoods, like Pagedale, that have been hard hit by the 
foreclosure crisis. As Krehmeyer points out, “we already have a template so we know what sort of 
debt these units can carry as rentals.” That helps manage their risk in expanding this business line. 
At the same time, strategic purchase of vacant units will help to protect and strengthen their existing 
portfolio against the negative ripple effects of nearby foreclosures.  
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To date, Krehmeyer has assembled a fund of $300,000 from the private sector and a local 
foundation. He and his team are still working through decisions as to how many units they will buy; 
this will depend in part on the debt structure they are able to assemble. They are also still finalizing 
the strategic criteria they should use in targeting their investment, beyond protecting their own 
assets. For example, they could look for properties in highly visible locations, or for eyesores that 
stand out as significant problems on their block. Krehmeyer is inclined to purchase as many 
properties as possible, reasoning that it will be a sound financial investment. When prices rebound 
they can decide to sell them and generate funds for other affordable housing, or retain them as a 
permanently affordable housing stock.  
 
Beyond Housing’s strategies were in place before the housing bubble burst. Implementing them will 
not represent a departure from their past practice, but instead an expansion of strategies in which 
they have already gained considerable expertise. Still, their holistic approach to strengthening 
individual families as well as the neighborhoods in which they live offers an excellent model for 
other communities hard hit by foreclosures and economic decline. 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. A neighborhood-focused revitalization approach engages residents in planning for and securing 
their community’s future. 
2. In a community with low incomes and high unemployment, supporting families through rent 
subsidies, IDAs, and services protects against further deterioration and decline. 
3. Beyond Housing will rely on a community stabilization strategy in which they already have 
considerable expertise; purchase-rehab and resale of single family homes.  The scattered-site 
rental approach allows low-income families to rent affordably in safe neighborhoods. Well-
managed housing serves as a model for other property owners and encourages them to invest in 
maintenance and improvements. 
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Sound neighborhood planning 
and established community 
revitalization practices are key 
to combating the foreclosure 
crisis in Chelsea. 
CND’s experience in 
acquiring and renovating 
scattered site 2 to 3 unit rental 
properties made this a natural 
strategy for dealing with 
vacant foreclosed properties. 
 
 
 
 
Chelsea Neighborhood Developers Converts 
Foreclosures to Scattered Site Rentals 
 
Moderate Price Increases & Subprime 
Lending/Foreclosure Spikes in Low Income, 
Minority Community 
 
 
“In every previous downturn Chelsea has been one of the first 
to fall, and has emerged in worse condition” says Ann Houston, 
Executive Director of Chelsea Neighborhood Developers 
(CND), a NeighborWorks® organization. This time, however, 
Houston, her staff of 10 full-time employees, and her board are 
determined that Chelsea will come out ahead. They plan to 
build on sound neighborhood planning and established 
community revitalization practices that were in place before the 
housing bubble burst. 
  
The challenges are significant. Chelsea, a tiny city just over the bridge from Boston, MA, is one of 
the most densely populated cities in the country. A majority Latino city, the 2000 Census found that 
36 percent of its population of roughly 38,000 had been in the country for less than 10 years, from 
Mexico, Central and Latin America, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, as well as Somalia, 
Rwanda, Condo, and the Sudan. New to the language and customs of the United States, these 
immigrants are vulnerable to subprime lenders. They are also more likely to be taken advantage of 
by landlords who buy up deteriorated properties and make minor cosmetic improvements, and then 
rent them to families they know are unlikely to complain. The housing stock has a high percentage 
of triple-deckers, especially in the lower income neighborhoods, which makes owner occupancy 
more difficult (the current homeownership rate is around 28 percent). Chelsea is also poor; about 20 
percent of families live below the poverty level, and the median household income in 1999 was 
$30,160, about 25 percent lower than the U.S. as a whole. As foreclosures have risen, Houston sees 
investors snatching up vacant properties that will simply depress the value of the neighborhood over 
the long term. 
 
Nevertheless, Houston has good reason to believe that 
Chelsea is more resilient than it has been in the past. Prior to 
the current crisis Chelsea was beginning to stabilize, thanks 
to a strong receivership program and other changes 
Post-Foreclosure Community Stabilization Strategies: Case Studies and Early Lessons 
www.StableCommunities.org 
 
 13 
A “tough process”, “tough 
prices”, and an “un-level 
playing field” add challenge 
to community stabilization. 
implemented by the City Manager. It was on its way to becoming a city of choice. Houston 
supported these positive changes when she brought CND back to “Community Revitalization 101” 
when she joined the organization in 2003. First, she looked to the organization’s own rental 
portfolio, which included about 86 units in scattered site, 2-3 unit buildings. These properties had 
been purchased piecemeal over many years, with many different loan structures, and they needed 
upgrades. Houston bundled them together into a single tax credit deal, did about $30,000 in rehab 
per unit, and brought in an outside property manager. Because the housing stock is fairly uniform 
CND now has a standard set of specifications, great relationships with contractors, and substantial 
experience in renovating properties with tenants in place. This experience supports Houston’s plan 
to stabilize Chelsea neighborhoods through acquisition of key problem properties that are vacant 
due to foreclosure. Over the next 12 months Houston plans to acquire 25-30 foreclosed properties, 
totaling 90 units, scattered throughout Chelsea. With new properties coming on the market daily, 
the question is how to decide which ones to purchase. 
 
While completing the refinancing and repairs on CND’s existing portfolio of scattered site rental 
units, Houston also sought ways to reach out to and engage Chelsea residents, especially in the 
city’s lower income neighborhoods. She opted to use the NeighborCircle model pioneered by 
Lawrence CommunityWorks, a new twist on the old neighborhood block meetings. CND’s 
NeighborCircles bring together 8-10 neighbors in a series of three facilitated dinners. The first one 
gives them a chance to get to know each other and learn what brought them all to Chelsea. In the 
second meeting they talk about neighborhood concerns, and in the third they decide what, if 
anything, they want to do about those issues. While the NeighborCircle meetings have led to 
traditional events such as block clean-ups, neighborhood watch groups, and block parties, CND has 
also used them to help make strategic decisions as to where they should acquire foreclosed 
properties. It makes sense for CND to target problem properties on blocks with high 
homeownership rates, and where there are strong “clusters” of families committed to improving the 
neighborhood. CND will also prioritize properties that are located on main commuting corridors, 
and which are near homes in its existing portfolio. 
 
Houston and her staff have also been working hard to stay on 
top of the market changes. Over the last year they have been 
tracking foreclosures to watch clusters and trends. They have 
also had to come to grips with a market that is more complex 
and volatile than ever before. Houston cites three reasons for 
this: 1) “tough process”- the securitization of mortgages makes 
it difficult to determine who is able to make decisions on a particular property; 2) “tough prices”- 
while prices have dropped, an influx of investors has created a floor that is higher than the 
properties’ condition warrants; and 3) “un-level playing field” - many of the lender brokers work 
with investors who purchase properties before they even hit the market. This makes it difficult for 
CND to intervene to stabilize the market. In Chelsea alone they have identified 65 foreclosure 
lenders/servicers, so it is hard to establish who is in charge. Houston also notes that there is 
typically one servicer and attorney at the foreclosure stage, and an entirely different servicer and 
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A line of credit from NHSA-
CDFI, and Massachusetts’ new, 
statewide Neighborhood 
Stabilization Loan Fund, will 
provide capital to help CND 
acquire and renovate foreclosed 
properties. 
attorney involved at the REO stage, which makes it far more difficult to build relationships. “Most 
of this is pretty opaque,” she admits, but they are making progress in sorting it out. 
 
Chelsea has recently closed on its second foreclosed property, and has others in the pipeline. The 
acquisition strategy was given a huge boost by CND’s 
leadership in the statewide Foreclosed Properties Task 
Force, an ad hoc group formed in January 2008 to focus the 
attention of high level policy makers and funders on the 
problems foreclosures were causing at the local level. 
Within six months of its first meeting the Task Force 
launched the $22 million Neighborhood Stabilization Loan 
Fund, securing a commitment of subsidy funding from the 
Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community 
Development. The Loan Fund was capitalized by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, the 
Massachusetts Housing Investment Corporation, the Boston Foundation and the Hyams Foundation. 
Living Cities, a New York-based non-profit, provided a $500,000 grant. The Fund creates two 
separate financing products: (a) a short-term acquisition line of credit of $250,000 to $1 million. 
This will allow developers to purchase properties on short notice at auction, on the open market, or 
in short-sale situations on a full-recourse basis with limited underwriting; and (b) an interim 
financing facility that will provide rehab financing (including first mortgage loans and subsidy 
funds of up to $60,000 per unit) to allow the properties to be re-sold to homebuyers or placed into a 
rental portfolio. Projects financed under this program must be part of a municipally-supported 
strategic neighborhood redevelopment plan. The CND Distressed Housing Initiative served as a test 
case in the design of the state loan pool. In addition, CND has secured a $1.5 million line of credit 
through Neighborhood Housing Services of America - CDFI, to acquire and hold properties until 
they are developed. This capital will allow CND to move quickly to purchase properties when they 
become available, improving its chances when competing with private investors. 
 
Although Chelsea has been hurt by the 
housing turmoil, Houston is optimistic 
about the future. The sound neighborhood 
planning CND has done over the last four 
years has helped them respond quickly to 
the foreclosure crisis. CND’s expertise in 
rehabbing and managing scattered site 
rentals means that they have a strong 
model for strategic purchase of foreclosed 
properties. Access to capital through 
NHSA-CDFI and the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Loan Fund will support this 
initiative. Houston notes that she, along  
A foreclosed and vacant unit in Chelsea 
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with many of her colleagues, remembers the downturn in the housing market in the late 1980s/early 
1990s. That experience has helped prepare them for the current crisis and has strengthened their 
resolve to intervene. “We are absolutely driven by knowing what happens in neighborhoods if you 
don’t address it”, Houston says. Much work remains, but this time around Chelsea will emerge from 
an economic downturn stronger than before. 
 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. The community engagement and neighborhood-based planning CND had completed before the 
housing market slumped provides a firm foundation on which to move forward. This work will 
help CND make strategic decisions regarding where it should invest in foreclosed properties. 
2. With extensive experience in scattered site, single-family rehab, whether for rental or for re-
sale, CND has the capacity to acquire and manage foreclosed inventory. 
3. Chelsea could not weather this storm alone. CND joined forces with other CDCs across the 
state, using their collective strength to create and attract capital for the $22 million 
Neighborhood Stabilization Loan Fund. CND also sought investment from the NHSA-CDFI. 
Access to this capital will significantly improve CND’s ability to intervene in Chelsea’s housing 
market. 
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When housing costs are high and 
foreclosures are dispersed, a 
neighborhood stabilization 
strategy requires substantial 
subsidy and the capacity to work 
in many areas at once. 
City First Enterprises Uses New Market Tax Credits to Redevelop Foreclosed 
Properties 
 
Double-Digit Housing Price Increases 2001-2005/Increasing Foreclosure Rates with Prices 
Remaining High 
 
The Washington, DC area initially appeared to dodge the foreclosure bullet. Until late 2007 its 
foreclosure rate was well below the national average, and its economy was relatively strong. In 
recent months, however, the region has had one of the highest foreclosure rates in the country, 
especially in the counties outside of the city. In DC, the foreclosures are concentrated in 10 of the 
city’s 21 inhabited zip codes, most of which are in the central and eastern parts of the city. There 
has been some price slippage at the high end, but moderately priced units are still selling and in 
some cases the prices are inching up. As of August 2008, 3-bedroom homes still average $528,000, 
with the condo market lower at $454,000.1 These prices are well beyond the reach of working 
families. 
 
High housing costs mean that foreclosure resolution in 
DC will require significant capital for acquisition and 
rehab, as well as for subsidies to make units affordable. A 
city-wide, scattered-site foreclosure problem also requires 
the capacity to work in multiple neighborhoods 
simultaneously. And absorbing the high numbers of 
foreclosures means operating at a larger scale.  
 
These were some of the considerations that led City First Enterprises (CFE), a nonprofit bank 
holding company of City First Bank, to the New Markets Tax Credit (NFTC) program. Congress 
established the NMTC program in 2000 as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act. In 
essence, the NMTC program provides a seven year, 39 percent federal income tax credit to 
encourage taxpayers to make equity investments in designated, for-profit Community Development 
Entities (CDEs). The CDEs must in turn invest 85 percent of the proceeds in projects benefiting 
low-income people and communities (known as Qualified Low-Income Community Investments). 
While their original purpose was economic development, NMTC funds can be used to finance 
businesses that purchase, rehab and sell single-family homes. CFE’s project is the first ever large 
scale use of NMTCs for foreclosure response. 
 
City First Bank, which is also a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), has already 
attracted over $160 million in NMTC that it has used for a variety of economic development 
projects. Working closely with its financial partner, NCB Capital Impact (NCBCI), CFE is putting 
the final touches on a $17.5 million deal using NMTCs to create workforce housing and to salvage 
REO property. This is Phase 1 of a more ambitious plan to create a $75 million pool of capital to 
                                                 
1 From www.dchousingprices.com  
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finance the creation of 1,000 units of permanently affordable workforce housing. CFE has launched 
a new nonprofit subsidiary, City First Homes (CFHomes) to administer the innovative program, 
which will help make units affordable and manage deed restrictions to ensure that they retain their 
affordability. 
 
The structure of the $17.5 million Phase 1 deal is illustrated in the following graphic: 
 
 
Funds from this pool will create 150 units of workforce housing, and support redevelopment of 50 
units of vacant, REO property. CFHomes will work with a network of local developers who will 
acquire, renovate, and sell the units. Homebuyers will receive a subsidy in the form of a $75,000, 
low interest rate second mortgage. In exchange for the subsidy they must agree to share a portion of 
future appreciation. CFHomes will use a model similar to a community land trust (CLT) to hold this 
value over the long term. 
 
David Wilkinson, CFE’s Executive Director, sees a number of advantages to this approach. “DC’s 
affordability gap is so large that it requires a lot of subsidy to help working families buy homes,” he 
points out. It’s increasingly difficult to raise the subsidy that we need, so we have to start building 
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A stripped-down CLT model 
will allow CFE to offer 
homebuyers a straightforward 
financial transaction; access to 
homeownership in the District 
in exchange for shared equity 
going forward. 
in permanent affordability.” The NMTCs help bring new money to the table for this purpose, but it 
must conform to the Treasury guidelines. Wilkinson points to the following innovations: 
 
1. The NMTC program’s high transaction costs mean that it is hard to pursue a deal of less than $4 
million. That number is out of reach for many nonprofits working at the local level. CFHomes 
will serve as the Qualified Active Low-Income Community Business (QALICB), which 
removes that burden from the small developer. At the same time, working through local 
developers will allow the NMTCs to be used at a much more micro level than is ordinarily the 
case. 
2. CFHomes will serve as the developer for the REOs. Through a special agreement with a major 
financial institution CFHomes will be able to look at units before they are listed with realtors. 
The plan is to buy 5-10 properties in a handful of neighborhoods. CFHomes will do an initial 
paper screen to see if it meets their price points, and then its experienced rehab team will 
perform a drive-by, a walk-through, and a building analysis and scope of work if it appears the 
property meets their requirements. Each of these steps will help CFHomes narrow down its list 
of properties to purchase, ensuring that it selects those units best suited to helping it achieve its 
dual goals of community impact and sustainability. Ultimately, the property must be affordable 
to the target population (with the help of CFHomes’ $75,000 second mortgage). 
3. The model uses CFHomes’ subsidy funds more efficiently because it provides only the portion 
of the purchase that will make the unit affordable to the target population. Whereas typical 
NMTC transactions will support an entire development, the CFHomes approach targets the 
funds and allows it to assist more units. 
4. Preserving the affordability adds efficiencies because the units are retained as part of a 
permanently affordable stock. Homeowners selling their units will get back 100 percent of their 
downpayment, their loan principal repayment, and the appraised value of any improvements 
they have made. They also receive a 25 percent share of any gain in equity through appreciation. 
The remaining 75 percent of appreciation, along with the initial subsidy, remain with the unit for 
the next qualified buyer. Target buyers will be at or below 80 percent of AMI.  
Wilkinson points to a Burlington (Vermont) Community Land Trust study of the first 100 
homeowners who sold and left the land trust. Fully 75 percent of them had sufficient funds to 
buy a unit on the private market, evidence that the land trust model is effective both at keeping 
house payments manageable so families can save money, and producing enough funds at the 
time of sale to help cover downpayment and closing costs for a new purchase. One major 
difference between CFHomes’ and the traditional CLT model is that CFHomes is approaching it 
primarily as a financial arrangement with the homebuyer. 
 
Wilkinson admits that there are challenges to implementing 
this approach. While initial market assessments are 
promising, it remains to be seen whether homebuyers will 
be willing to trade equity for access to homeownership, and 
the chance to live in the District instead of commuting in 
from the suburbs. The model also requires subsidy over and 
above the NMTCs, which is a constant challenge. 
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Nevertheless, Wilkinson is optimistic that it will be a useful model for CDCs working in other 
markets across the country. He notes that the CDFI Fund has shown significant interest in this 
approach, and may encourage other groups to use NMTC in this way to address the foreclosure 
crisis. 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. Scaled solutions to the problem of filling foreclosed and vacant properties will require access to 
significant amounts of capital. CFE has created a structure that can access the NMTCs, and then 
through CFHomes work with a network of local CDCs to renovate and resell the units. This 
creates new capacity that can expedite use of NMTCs for foreclosure remediation, without 
duplicating CDC housing expertise that already exists.   
2. Working with a network of existing CDCs increases the volume of units that can be assisted at 
any one time, and allows work to be carried out in a variety of neighborhoods. 
3. The subsidy recapture/shared appreciation model will be of great interest to CDCs working in 
high cost markets that require high levels of subsidy to make units affordable.   
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Central Ohio is reeling from the 
combined effects of an economy 
in transition from manufacturing 
to service sector jobs, and the 
foreclosure crisis. 
Columbus Housing Partnership Raises NMTC Capital to Revitalize 
Neighborhoods 
 
Rapid Increase in Housing Prices/Rapid Decrease, Regional Economic Depression 
 
In the last four years 30,000 property owners in 
Columbus, Ohio and surrounding Franklin County have 
lost their properties to foreclosure. This is 35 percent of 
the 85,000 foreclosures during that period in Ohio as a 
whole. Subprime mortgage lending is only part of the 
story; the larger context is the state economy transitioning 
from high paying manufacturing jobs to service sector 
employment. Homeowners are struggling to adjust to 
lower wages, and some simply cannot find a way to do it.  
 
Columbus Housing Partnership (CHP), a NeighborWorks® organization, is poised to play a critical 
role in Columbus’ recovery from the foreclosure crisis. In its 21 year history CHP has developed 
4,000 units of single and multi-family housing, both new construction and acquisition-rehab.  
 
Columbus is the state’s largest city in terms of geography and population. With over 4,100 vacant 
homes, and accelerating disinvestment and deterioration, the city has been anxious to stabilize its 
neighborhoods. It developed the Home Again campaign to attract buyers back to the central Ohio 
region. As the region’s largest and most sophisticated nonprofit community development 
corporation, CHP needed to come up with substantial capital to finance a large volume of housing 
activity. A recent initiative (the deal closed in October 2007) is to raise the capital through the New 
Market Tax Credit (NMTC) program.  
 
Congress established the NMTC program in 2000 as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief 
Act. In essence, the NMTC program provides a seven year, 39 percent federal income tax credit to 
encourage taxpayers to make equity investments in designated, forprofit Community Development 
Entities (CDEs). The CDEs must in turn invest 85 percent of the proceeds in projects benefiting 
low-income people and communities (known as Qualified Low-Income Community Investments). 
While their original purpose was economic development, NMTC funds can be used to finance 
businesses that purchase, rehab and sell single-family homes, and that is how they are structured to 
support CHP’s initiative. 
 
Tax credit deals are not simple transactions. They are highly complex structures that require 
extensive involvement of attorneys and accountants. CDEs must demonstrate to potential investors 
that they have the capacity to develop eligible projects that will qualify for tax credits throughout 
the seven-year investment period.  Below a certain threshold, these deals do not make economic 
sense because the transaction costs are so high. 
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NMTCs can help CDCs put 
together a large pool of funds at 
attractive rates to support large  
scale single-family 
redevelopment, either scattered 
site or in concentrated areas. 
Working with Enterprise Community Investment (ECI) and 
the City of Columbus, CHP put together $9.5 million in 
debt financing using $3 million in equity and $6.5 million 
in debt, at a blended rate of under 2 percent interest. The 
tax credit investors were Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company and the Huntington Community Development 
Corporation, a subsidiary of Huntington National Bank.  
 
The plan was for funds to be recycled annually as houses were developed, at a proposed volume of 
100 units annually over seven years. To produce that volume CHP planned several initiatives:   
 
• Acquisition-rehab-resale of foreclosed single-family inventory in selected census tracts. 
Originally CHP hoped to do this in conjunction with HUD’s Asset Control Area (ACA) 
program, but this plan was abandoned because it was too difficult to control costs, and CHP lost 
money on the first 35 units it completed. The ACA contract requires participants to accept any 
FHA foreclosed properties in the target area they negotiate with HUD, no matter what their 
condition. Many of the properties CHP had to take were very deteriorated or on streets with very 
low homeownership rates, which made them financially infeasible to renovate and sell within 
HUD’s parameters.  
Instead, CHP is working with the City of Columbus, which can acquire FHA foreclosures for $1 
and re-sell them to CHP, and with local realtors and property sales lists. This approach allows 
CHP to use a more strategic approach, acquiring properties in or near clusters of owner-
occupied properties in order to stabilize them, and moving outward from there. 
• Redeveloping the King-Lincoln District, a highly distressed area of Columbus. The City of 
Columbus plans to create an economically diverse urban community by creating mixed-income 
housing opportunities. CHP will be the primary housing developer, in conjunction with Trevor 
Custom Homes. The plan calls for renovating existing housing and developing new stock, using 
green design principles as much as possible. It will create concentrations of homeowners, one 
block at a time, expanding outward in concentric rings from these core clusters. The City of 
Columbus will contribute extensive infrastructure improvements, including construction of a 
new “green” park at the entrance to the community as well as street, lighting, and sidewalk 
improvements. The City will also provide subsidy to make home purchase more affordable for 
low and moderate income buyers (these subsidies will be available in other neighborhoods as 
well). 
• American Addition is a historically African-American community in northeast Columbus. Over 
the years much of its housing has been torn down; it currently has 268 platted parcels, of which 
200 are vacant lots. CHP plans to redevelop it using mixed home designs for single-family units, 
and selectively placed multi-family and condo properties. To have a significant impact on the 
market, CHP will acquire and develop 125 vacant lots and properties, redevelop them, and sell 
them to homeowners. Again, the City will make infrastructure improvements that improve the 
community’s appearance and make it more attractive to buyers. 
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Unfortunately, CHP’s careful and detailed planning came together just as the bottom fell out of 
Columbus’ housing market. With housing prices falling, credit tightening, and families worried 
about their financial future, Amy Klaben, CHP’s Executive Director, says she hopes to sell 20-25 
units in 2008. This is far less than the 100 year they had been planning on. 
 
This does not mean that using NMTC to support 
housing development is a bad idea. Indeed, Klaben 
remains quite positive about their value for raising the 
large pools of capital CDCs will require in order to 
recover from the foreclosure crisis. “NMTCs are a good 
source of funds for future projects,” says Klaben.  
“However, there are some changes that should be made 
to help make this more flexible and easier to use.” One 
of these is the requirement that the funds raised support 
development and sale of single-family homes to owner-
occupants. Renting properties is currently prohibited by 
program guidelines, even as a short-term bridge 
strategy to get through the current housing crisis. This prohibits using a lease-purchase program to 
fill vacant units, as this is considered renting rather than buying.  
 
In the short term this puts CHP and its investors in a squeeze, and they are working closely with 
ECI and other stakeholders to work through this. However, Klaben and her colleagues have 
developed a model for raising capital to support single-family housing redevelopment that can be 
replicated in other communities across the country.    
 
Best Practices 
 
1. Redevelopment of housing on a large scale, whether it’s foreclosed property or related to 
initiatives such as American Addition, requires access to large amounts of capital. The NMTC 
supports these efforts by going beyond traditional public subsidies to raise money from private 
sector investors. 
2. Joining forces with the City of Columbus gave CHP an opportunity to create housing- and 
neighborhood-impact on a grand scale. While the housing market downturn has slowed 
implementation of the plans in the near term, as prices rebound these partnerships and plans will 
provide a strong foundation for moving forward. 
 
 
Post-Foreclosure Community Stabilization Strategies: Case Studies and Early Lessons 
www.StableCommunities.org 
 
 23 
Property values have plummeted 
close to 40% in the Twin Cities 
area; over 20,000 homes were 
sold at sheriff’s sales in 2007 
alone. 
New partners provide assistance in 
attracting capital, designing 
systems, and providing access to 
policymakers and decision-makers 
that is vital to bringing local efforts 
up to scale. 
Dayton’s Bluff: Working with Local and Regional Partners to Stabilize St. Paul 
Neighborhoods 
 
Rapid Housing Price Increase 2000-2005/Rapid Loss of Home Values to 2000 Levels 
 
Executive Director Jim Erchul has watched in growing dismay as neighborhoods he spent the last 
18 years improving fell victim to the housing boom and bust. “It’s like you’re seeing a whole adult 
life’s worth of work go up in a flash,” he says sadly. Since 1980, Dayton’s Bluff, a 
NeighborWorks® organization, has invested more than $123 million in over 2,000 housing units 
throughout St. Paul. Following the last housing downturn, 
in the early 1990s, Dayton’s Bluff acquired, renovated, 
and re-sold single-family homes that had been lost to 
foreclosure. When the city tore down vacant, abandoned 
housing, Dayton’s Bluff assembled larger parcels and built 
mini-subdivisions and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
projects. The neighborhoods recovered and most seemed 
healthy and strong. 
 
Then in 2000 St. Paul’s housing market really took off, fueled by investors and “exotic” mortgage 
lending. The market peaked in 2005, and by 2006 the investors were beginning to lose their homes 
to foreclosure. These properties were typically 2 - 4 unit buildings that had been single-family 
homes; they were highly leveraged and typically in poor condition. The next hit were homeowners 
who had purchased with conventional financing but had refinanced into subprime loans. Most 
recently people with adjustable rate, subprime mortgages are losing their homes in increasing 
numbers as their loans re-set. Erchul notes that these buyers have lost so much value in their 
properties, and have such high payments, that when they hit any bump in the road letting them go to 
foreclosure seems like a rational response. He estimates that property values in St. Paul’s east side 
have plummeted close to 40 percent, roughly equal to where they were in 2000, though in the Twin 
Cities as a whole they are down about 12 percent since 2005. 
 
There were over 20,000 sheriff’s sales in the Twin Cities area in 2007, up 83 percent from 2006. 
Foreclosures are scattered throughout St. Paul, though there are clusters in some of the older 
neighborhoods with housing built over a century ago. Fires at vacant homes are beginning to occur 
more frequently, and the city is once again tearing down dilapidated structures. Demolition leaves 
behind unkempt lots owned by servicers who do not care when they fill with trash and weeds. 
Speculators are beginning to nose around again, looking 
for bargains that had all but vanished near the peak. 
 
Dayton’s Bluff will attack the foreclosure problem using 
the same tools it has used before, but this time it will have 
help from new partnerships that have formed in the metro 
area in response to the crisis. These include the following: 
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• The City of St. Paul created the Neighborhood Revitalization Fund, which is funded through a 
half cent of the municipal sales tax. When they saw the foreclosure crisis looming, City Council 
members agreed to issue bonds backed by the anticipated revenues from the sales tax. This 
created a pool of funds that will be used to stabilize St. Paul’s hardest hit neighborhoods. 
 
• The McKnight Foundation, along with the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, created the 
Family Housing Fund in 1980 to provide private financial support for affordable rental housing 
and homeownership opportunities in the two cities. The Fund now acts as a funder, convener, 
and educator to build public-private partnerships to address the entire region’s affordable 
housing needs. It offers CDCs a working capital fund, and a second mortgage program to help 
homeowners refinance. Recently it has created a contract-for-deed program that helps buyers 
work towards purchasing the home they live in without having to qualify at the outset for 
conventional financing. 
 
• The Minnesota Foreclosure Funders’ Council is an ad hoc group established by the Family 
Housing Fund in late 2006 to help coordinate community responses to foreclosure, acting as a 
sort of “switching station” to facilitate communication. The Council also uses its collective 
strength to seek solutions and negotiate funding that individual groups working alone could not 
achieve. An early success was persuading servicers to establish dedicated lines so that housing 
counselors could contact them to work out troubled mortgages. One of its current initiatives is to 
try to facilitate bulk purchases of foreclosed properties from servicers. This will help nonprofits 
work at a larger scale, and reduce the time (and perhaps money) needed to acquire properties. 
 
• The Minnesota Home Ownership Center (MHOC) is an intermediary founded in 1993 to 
promote sustainable homeownership for Minnesota residents. It works in partnership with 
community-based partners throughout the state. To facilitate communication around the 
foreclosure crisis, MHOC created a listserve that circulates updates several times a month. 
These notices may include information about upcoming outreach events, media coverage, new 
tools for consumers, or information from lenders and servicers. MHOC’s website offers 
marketing material nonprofits can download and distribute as part of their outreach to distressed 
homeowners, as well as other material relevant to the foreclosure process. Finally, MBOS helps 
organize Borrower Workshops, modeled after Homebuyer Fairs, where distressed homeowners 
can come and hear presentations, and speak with housing counselors or lenders about their 
mortgage difficulties. 
 
• The National Community Stabilization Trust (NCST) is a national entity formed by 
NeighborWorks® America, LISC, Enterprise Community Partners, and the Housing Partnership 
Network. NCST will coordinate the acquisition or transfer of real estate owned (REO) 
properties from lenders, loan servicers, investors and GSEs nationwide. It will then work 
through local organizations, in collaboration with state and local governments, to make the 
properties available for purchase by low- and moderate-income families. Minneapolis and St. 
Paul hope to participate in a pilot of this effort. 
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A unit renovated by Dayton’s Bluff. 
Dayton’s Bluff is a seasoned CDC with extensive experience 
in both single family and multi-family housing. But the scale 
of the foreclosure crisis threatens to overwhelm its efforts. On 
its own, Dayton’s Bluff could not wield the political clout 
needed to bring servicers, politicians, and other policymakers 
to the table with the speed required in order to marshal a 
timely response. Nor would it be able to raise the huge 
amounts of capital required to acquire and renovate properties.  
At the same time, the consortia and collaborative that have 
grown up in the Twin Cities area could not be effective 
without groups like Dayton’s Bluff. Both are part of the 
essential infrastructure that will be needed to turn thousands of vacant, foreclosed properties from 
neighborhood eyesores to neighborhood assets.  
 
Best Practices 
 
1. Dayton’s Bluff has extensive experience in creating rental and homeownership opportunities in 
St. Paul’s single family market. But when the foreclosure crisis hit, it had to work closely with 
other partners, new and existing, to come up with solutions to the crisis. The partnerships 
worked at many levels that were vital to success, including marketing to distressed homeowners, 
facilitating communication among the partners, raising capital, improving access to servicers, 
and developing new tools for stabilizing neighborhoods. 
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Bank asset managers 
responsible for disposing of 
REO or paper may be 
working with little 
knowledge of the properties 
or the neighborhoods in 
which they are located. 
HANDS Inc./CAPC Purchase Pools of REO or Notes to Stabilize Foreclosed 
Properties and Neighborhoods 
 
High Percentage of Subprime Mortgages for Purchase and Refinance/High Foreclosures  
 
HANDS Inc. tried for months to persuade a large portfolio lender to negotiate on a pool of 
nonperforming mortgages. The first challenge was convincing the bank that a CDC was worth 
doing business with. HANDS first won a 60 day exclusive due diligence period to evaluate the 
properties and the mortgages and to put together a sound offer, one that  made some economic sense 
for HANDS to buy them and one that was defensible if the bank insisted on a price that was much 
more than the properties’ actual value. After contracting with a foreclosure attorney, a rehab expert 
and a REO real estate broker and thoroughly examining every house and neighborhood, Wayne 
Meyer and Patrick Morrissy of HANDS presented their offer. 
 
Not long after that, the banks’ lawyers contacted them and the real negotiations started. The 
properties, many of them vacant, none of them owner-occupied, 
were scattered throughout a number of low and moderate income 
neighborhoods. All were deteriorated and contributing to 
neighborhood blight; their boilers and copper had been stripped, 
and they had not been sealed against the coming winter. Most 
were surrounded by properties that were not much better off. The 
bank would have to wait a long time before the market rebounded 
to the level at which they had been hoping to sell. The bank was 
apparently quite surprised by the loss they were facing on these 
properties.  
 
That was when HANDS sent the photos. 
 
After a brief period of counteroffers, the bank and HANDS reached an agreement and they are in 
the final stages of closing the deal. Until it closes the full details cannot be made public, but there 
are some valuable lessons Morrissy and his colleagues have learned that are worth highlighting 
now. 
 
First, some introductions. Morrissy and Meyer are the Executive Director and Housing Director of 
Housing and Neighborhood Development Services, Inc. (HANDS). HANDS is a 20 year-old 
community development corporation active in Orange and East Orange, New Jersey, bordering 
Newark. Morrissy and Meyer also manage the pilot effort described above which is known as 
Operation Neighborhood Recovery (ONR), a project of the Community Asset Preservation 
Corporation (CAPC) of New Jersey. CAPC is a new organization being created in response to the 
housing crisis, with a mission to stabilize neighborhoods affected by mortgage foreclosures, help 
homeowners avoid foreclosure, return vacant foreclosed property to productive reuse, and increase 
the availability of affordable housing. Once it has obtained its 501©3 status CAPC will take over 
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the ONC work and proceed with new bulk purchases of distressed assets throughout Essex County, 
New Jersey. The Project Director is Harold Simon, formerly Executive Director of the National 
Housing Institute, and a board member of HANDS. 
 
HANDS launched ONR as a pilot to test an approach to stabilizing New Jersey neighborhoods 
reeling from foreclosures. Rather than buying properties one-by-one, a time consuming and 
expensive process Simon compares to “guerrilla warfare”, the model calls for purchasing blocks of 
REO or notes from lenders and servicers. Once purchased, several different strategies will be used 
to stabilize the properties. Loans that cannot be modified or otherwise saved will go to foreclosure. 
Most properties will be sold as affordable housing to low- and moderate-income buyers, but some 
will be sold as market rate units to higher income families. Market rate sales will generate internal 
subsidies to help make the other units affordable, and produce fee income to sustain CAPC 
operations.  
 
CAPC will negotiate for the bulk purchase of properties, and then convey them to CDCs to 
redevelop, or to private developers, to local governments, or other entities for reuse. Finally, where 
indicated, it may demolish and/or land bank properties for future sale or redevelopment. Over a 
three-to-five year period CAPC plans to scale up its operation to the point where it can take on the 
recovery of 1,000 to 1,500 units, working in collaboration with up to five CDCs who will be 
responsible for disposition of the units once purchased. 
 
The ONR pilot has yielded a number of useful lessons for CDCs seeking to purchase bank REO or 
paper: 
 
• Most large banks have experienced tremendous upheaval following the collapse of the housing 
market. CDCs that had previously enjoyed relationships with bank community development 
officers who knew them, and were well acquainted with the communities they serve, may find 
that these personnel have been re-assigned or have left the bank altogether. Instead, they may 
find themselves dealing with asset managers who have no idea what a community development 
corporation is. This may require additional background work, such as sending the asset manager 
information about the CDC’s mission, structure, financing, track record, and goals.  
• With thousands of units to dispose of, asset managers may also have no information about the 
units in their REO portfolio or the communities in which they are located. That was why 
Morrissy and Meyer had to send photographs to back up their lower estimates of the properties’ 
value. The photos helped to break the deadlock and allow negotiations to move forward. 
• Even if CDCs have viewed the properties from the outside, closer inspections are required to 
really understand the properties’ condition and value. There was a specified a period during 
which HANDS staff could enter the units. While this work was in process the bank would not 
foreclose on or otherwise dispose of the properties.  Meyer did a top to bottom inspection of 
every property, decided whether it would require a gut rehab or a lesser amount of renovation, 
estimated these costs, and got a broker’s price opinion on the potential resale price. This helped 
them back into the price they could afford to offer for the units. 
Post-Foreclosure Community Stabilization Strategies: Case Studies and Early Lessons 
www.StableCommunities.org 
 
 28 
Simon urges CDCs purchasing REO 
properties in bulk from lenders and 
servicers to make sure they do so at 
a price that makes sense for them, 
and only following a thorough 
work-up of the numbers. 
Careful analysis of blocks of 
properties takes time and money, 
and requires a source of risk 
capital that does not have to be 
repaid. 
• The price per unit will be influenced by the public 
subsidy that is available to make the units 
affordable to lower-income buyers. HANDS 
negotiated forward commitments of subsidy from 
several local governments, so that information 
could be factored into their pricing decisions. 
 
• CDCs should consider the range of quality of the 
housing they are purchasing in the bulk sale. If there are 50 mortgages, and 40 are on properties 
that need to be demolished, that information should affect the price that is offered.  CDCs need 
to consider the market for the properties they are buying and what they can dispose of within a 
given time frame. 
 
• Even though CDCs typically have a mission to support affordable housing, in a bulk purchase it 
is likely that some properties will have to be re-sold as market rate units. In the current 
downturn there simply may not be sufficient low- and moderate-income buyers to match the 
available inventory. Selling some to market rate buyers will move them more quickly, generate 
income for CDCs to sustain their operations or provide an internal subsidy to other affordable 
housing units, and help preserve income diversity within the neighborhoods. 
 
• CDCs should be prepared to negotiate hard on price of REO assets or paper. Banks will be eager 
to dispose of their REOs at a price that works for them. They may lack the detailed knowledge 
of local markets that CDCs have, or they may mistakenly believe that CDCs can access grant 
money to help subsidize the purchase. CDCs need to make the numbers work for them based on 
the condition of the properties, their available funds, current market conditions, and what the 
end buyers can afford. They should make sure to include in their pricing calculations carrying 
costs for the properties, and the costs to foreclose on them if this has not already occurred. 
 
• Finally, there is a risk to this approach. Analyzing 
dozens of properties in this level of detail takes time, 
and there is no guarantee that the bank will accept the 
offer that comes out of it. CDCs using this strategy need 
to have risk capital they can afford to lose if the deal 
does not go through. There are also opportunity costs; 
the analysis ties up staff time which cannot be used for 
other purposes. This is another reason why CDCs 
should choose their projects carefully.   
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Best Practices 
 
1. HANDS’ staff persisted in their efforts to persuade the lender that the properties they wished to 
purchase were not as valuable as the bank thought. They used their more detailed knowledge of 
the local market, and took the unconventional step of sending photographs to the asset manager 
in order to make their case. 
2. They also did a thorough analysis of the units to ensure they had a good handle on how many 
they would have to demolish, and the cost to renovate the remainder. 
3. To reduce the risk that they will be left holding units HANDS and CAPC have developed 
multiple disposition strategies that do not rely on just one market segment in order to move the 
properties. 
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In the face of forecloses 
happening at the rate of one 
every 20 minutes, LA NHS has 
temporarily had to emphasize a 
humanitarian response over its 
ordinary housing programming 
to help minimize families’ 
disruption as they transition out 
of their homes.  
Los Angeles NHS Employs Family-Focused Community Stabilization Strategy  
 
High Housing Price Increases, Speculation/Rapid Decline, Widespread Foreclosures 
 
In a post-disaster scenario such as the hurricanes that hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, aid organizations 
know that first you make sure people have the basics; shelter, food, and health care. Then you start 
worrying about the long term. 
 
The foreclosure storm that hit California has lasted years, not days, and it is still wreaking havoc in 
neighborhoods. It is hard to make headway in promoting 
homeownership in the face of such a profound 
restructuring in the real estate market. As Lori Gay, 
Executive Director of Los Angeles Neighborhood 
Housing Services explains, these days so many families 
got in so far over their heads in debt that “half the time 
people don’t need to be modified- they just need to 
move.” Stripped of their assets, demoralized, and in 
unfamiliar territory, homeowners in the thousands have 
turned to LA NHS for assistance. In response, LA NHS 
has changed its focus from creating and financing affordable housing opportunities for first time 
homebuyers to helping families transition quickly, and with as little disruption as possible, through 
foreclosure and into affordable rental housing. In this time of crisis, detouring from its original 
business model is the best way LA NHS can help families and try to keep neighborhoods intact. 
 
Gay and her team recognized as early as 2003 that California’s housing market was teetering on the 
brink of disaster. A study jointly undertaken with Harvard/MIT’s Joint Center for Housing Studies 
confirmed their worst fears. Already, low income and minority neighborhoods were seeing seven 
times the foreclosure rates of other communities. LA NHS used this study to begin doing marketing 
and outreach to those who were most vulnerable to foreclosure. Gay also began retooling, cross-
training her staff to deal with foreclosure issues, and reaching out to peer organizations to help them 
do the same. She helped form the NeighborWorks® Center for Foreclosure Solutions (CFS) in LA 
County, a coalition of government, financial institutions, consumer protection attorneys, housing 
counseling agencies and advocacy groups striving to find solutions to the growing problem of 
foreclosures.   
 
By 2007 foreclosures were happening in LA County at the rate of one every 90 minutes; today, 
there is one every 20 minutes. The volume is simply overwhelming. “Where we went wrong is that 
we thought we could help people modify their loans if we got to them soon enough,” says Gay. 
“The reality is, at this point only one or two out of 100 gets modified. With so many loans in trouble 
at once, homeowners may not be able to connect with their servicer before the foreclosure 
happens.” In this environment “cash for keys” is a popular and relatively painless resolution; the 
homeowner agrees to accept a lump sum of $2,500 from the lender in exchange for moving out and 
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Foreclosed Home in SW Los Angeles  
 
LA NHS has found that distressed 
homeowners are best reached using 
a range of strategies, including news 
releases, and outreach to churches 
and employers. 
leaving the property intact. The payment can be used to pay the deposit on a rental unit and cover 
the cost of the move. 
 
These days LA NHS staff focus on helping families make a “respectful” transition. LA NHS works 
closely with the LA County Property Owners Association, whose members often agree to 
discounted fees and rents in order to get foreclosure affected families into available rental housing 
as quickly as possible. They will try to keep families in the same neighborhood and school district 
wherever possible, to minimize disruption to children’s education. Knowing that they will be 
helped, even though they have little money and their credit is ruined, has helped families accept 
their situation and move on. 
 
Gay has found that homeowners need multiple points of entry to get help; there is no one strategy 
that will reach all of them. Twice each week CFS and LA NHS hold “foreclosure prevention fairs” 
where distressed homeowners can come and get information about the foreclosure process, and 
meet with select servicers and housing counselors to try 
to resolve their loan problems. These events typically 
attract 150-200 people each. Larger events held once a 
month for a similar purpose routinely draw 250-300 
homeowners. All of these events are offered in English 
and Spanish, and they are adding Asian/Pacific Islander 
languages as well. CFS and LA NHS also have a faith-
based and workplace initiative, reaching out to churches and employers to help find homeowners 
needing assistance.  
 
While its humanitarian mission temporarily has high priority, LA NHS continues pursuing its 
housing mission. It still offers homebuyer education and counseling for first-time buyers, as well as 
help in finding housing and securing financing. It still acquires, renovates, and re-sells units to 
homeowners. However, production is well below normal levels. Gay hopes that within the next four 
to six months the housing market, which has dropped from 15 to 50 percent depending on the 
community, will find the bottom. When that happens, LA NHS is positioning itself to be ready to 
put qualified buyers into vacant homes.   
 
LA NHS is a NeighborWorks® organization and a Community Development Financial Institution 
(CDFI), which gives it access to the significant technical and financial assistance that will be 
needed to help LA neighborhoods recover. Using these and other resources, LA NHS is undertaking 
the following initiatives: 
 
• Through an in-house real estate broker service LA 
NHS serves as a listing broker for lenders and 
servicers; Countrywide is one of its biggest clients. 
This gives LA NHS access to both the foreclosed 
homeowner and the property. Brokers do a quick 
screen of the homeowner, helping it access financial 
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counseling or relocation assistance as needed. They provide an opinion of value on the unit and 
list it on the MLS. Trying to steer units away from speculative investors, they make every effort 
to find buyers who will take care of the property and be assets to the neighborhood, such as 
families who have completed homebuyer education and counseling. If the property sells LA 
NHS earns a 2 percent commission. Current volume is about 100-120 units annually, but Gay 
hopes this will pick up once the market stabilizes. 
• Purchase-rehab-resale of existing properties continues to be a business line for LA NHS, but 
volume has dropped to under 20 a month. As Gay points out, “there’s no point in purchasing 50 
properties if you only have 20 buyers”. Still, this will be a major focus going forward, with 
plans to ramp up to 30 units a month, or 360 in the course of a year. The business model calls 
for purchasing foreclosed properties at 30–50 percent discounts in order to make them 
affordable to low and moderate income buyers. These discounts will also provide a cushion 
against continued market declines or a slow recovery. 
 
Gay estimates that it will require $7 million in capital to produce the 360 properties annually and to 
facilitate sales of an additional 2,500 properties through partnerships with the CFS members. This 
capital will come from NeighborWorks® America, the CDFI Fund, congressional appropriations 
such as the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, state-funded initiatives, and foundation grants.  
 
As bad as it has been in LA County, Gay sees some signs for optimism going forward. Chief among 
these are the partnerships LA NHS has forged with other CDCs and nonprofit service providers, 
local and state governments, and private sector organizations such as the LA County Property 
Owners Association.  These relationships will help LA NHS advocate for new resources to help 
distressed homeowners, such as a relocation assistance fund. Ultimately, these partnerships will also 
help LA NHS reach out to a broader spectrum of new buyers who will fill the properties that now sit 
vacant, and create healthy, vibrant neighborhoods once again. 
 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. LA NHS looked ahead and saw the housing crisis looming. While it was unable to stop it, the 
work it did to restructure its programming, cross-train staff, and reach out to partners 
undoubtedly helped it to handle the storm when it hit. 
2. Reaching out to other CDCs, local and state governments, and private sector entities through the 
Los Angeles County Center for Foreclosure Solutions has helped concentrate and focus 
resources available not just to help affected homeowners but to stabilize neighborhoods once the 
crisis is over. 
3. LA NHS is also working creatively with lenders and servicers by serving as a listing agent, 
giving them access to homeowners as they transition out of the homes, and some influence over 
the disposition of the properties. 
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In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, 
neighborhood recovery goes beyond 
simply filling vacant units to 
repairing the frayed fabric of the 
community as a whole. 
The pastor of St. Nicholas parish 
compared the foreclosure crisis 
to a “silent tornado”, a crisis as 
devastating to the community as 
a high winds would be but more 
insidious because it occurred 
over weeks and months, not in a 
single event. 
NHS of Chicago Uses Old-Style Community Organizing to Help Stabilize 
Neighborhoods 
 
Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) of Chicago was 
one of the first NeighborWorks® organizations 
nationally to recognize a disturbing increase in 
foreclosures in its target neighborhoods. Over many 
years NHS had been working patiently to build up 
homeownership, improve the housing stock, and 
support residents in efforts to make their neighborhoods healthy places in which to work and live. 
NHS staff watched in growing dismay as foreclosures began to threaten the health of neighborhoods 
they had helped strengthen. The remedy demanded a response over and above simply taking care of 
individual families and properties affected by foreclosure. 
 
With funding from Chicago LISC’s New Communities Program (supported by the MacArthur 
Foundation) NHS staff joined with Chicago’s Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP) to map out a 
strategy for organizing around the issue. In the spring of 2008 they began meeting with community 
leaders and canvassing door-to-door, targeting Chicago-Lawn/Gage Park, also known as Marquette 
Park. This is one of Chicago’s most diverse neighborhoods, whose population includes blacks, 
Latinos, white ethnic families, and a growing Middle Eastern presence. The area has a population of 
138,000, with about 35,000 occupied housing units. Part of Chicago’s famous “bungalow belt”, the 
neighborhood consists primarily of modest single-family homes, with an owner occupancy rate of 
about 61percent. 
 
Soon the organizing centered around St. Nicholas Church, a venerable institution with a 90 year 
history in the neighborhood. Organizers met at the church with members of the parish, and learned 
that the deacon had lost his home and was renting, and that the choir director had just been through 
foreclosure as well. This reinforced the sense that the issue was bigger than simply individual 
families; foreclosures affected church leaders and the health of the parish as a whole. With the help 
of about 20 members who wanted to work on the issue, NHS began constructing a map of the parish 
and pinpointing where foreclosures had occurred.  
 
A small group took the map to the pastor and asked for his help 
in raising awareness of the issue within the parish. The pastor 
immediately understood the gravity of the situation, and agreed 
to write an article for the church bulletin. Several weeks later he 
made it the subject of one of his homilies during church 
services. Calling the crisis a “silent tornado”, he pointed out 
that if a tornado hit the neighborhood people would respond 
with care and comfort for those who had suffered. The 
foreclosure crisis, he declared, was no less damaging to the 
neighborhood, it just happened more slowly, over time. It was time they looked after their own. 
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On the same Sunday that the pastor dedicated a homily to the issue, the parish organizing group 
included a simply survey in the bulletin with the foreclosure map on it. The survey asked the 
following questions: 
 
• Are you a homeowner? 
• Are there vacant buildings on your block? 
• What kind of a mortgage do you have? (Many did not know the answer to this question) 
• Are you behind on your mortgage payments? 
• Are you in foreclosure?   
• Are you current on your loan but worried about your ability to continue payments? 
• Would you be willing to work with the parish on this issue? 
 
A total of 431 surveys were completed and returned. A total of 12 respondents indicated they were 
in foreclosure, 40 were behind on their payments, and 170 were concerned about their future ability 
to keep up. The remainder (209) reported their mortgages were not a problem. Altogether, just over 
half of survey respondents were negatively affected by the foreclosure crisis, an extraordinary 
testimony to the depth and breadth of the issue within the parish. 
 
In response to the survey, both NHS and SWOP expanded their counseling resources in the 
neighborhood so they could assist affected families. They reached out directly to those in 
foreclosure or who were behind on their mortgages.  
 
The organizing effort continues within St. Nicholas’ parish, and NHS plans to expand into others as 
well. When Michael Reardon, Director of NHS’ Chicago-Lawn/Gage Park neighborhood office, 
interviews community stakeholders he asks them “How important is the church to you?” He is 
impressed by how many people respond “I’m still here because St. Nicholas is here”. Clearly, the 
church helps unite and strengthen the community against negative change, and to articulate its 
values. Reardon believes it will also play a key role in filling vacant homes and helping the 
community recover from the foreclosure crisis. 
 
“There is a very direct self-interest on the part of churches and schools in combating foreclosures,” 
says Reardon. “If schools lose families, and pastors lose church leaders they have spent years 
developing, it will have serious impacts. As a community, we need to deal with this issue 
collectively.” 
 
While Reardon is thankful that NHS Chicago has counseling tools and resources that can help 
foreclosure-affected families, he sees a down side to that as well. “We needed to offer the 
foreclosure counseling, but it’s turned us into a social service organization and we have lost touch 
with the need to be a force for change” says Reardon.  As one person he spoke to asked him, 
“Where is the anger about this?” The foreclosure crisis was something that was done to the 
neighborhood by unscrupulous mortgage lenders and a lax regulatory system. Reardon worries that 
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The foreclosure crisis reminds us 
that homes’ value cannot be 
separated from the neighborhoods in 
which they are located.  
“as long as we treat it solely as a counseling issue, the blame will remain with the homeowner and 
those responsible will not be held accountable.” 
 
NHS has no master plan for its organizing effort. Reardon is confident that momentum will 
continue to build and that a consensus will emerge as to what action should be taken. It could take 
the form of demanding that lenders responsible for large shares of troubled subprime loans actively 
participate in developing solutions. It might also take the form of enacting legislation or regulation 
that protects homeowners against future exploitation and abuse. 
 
If there is a silver lining in the foreclosure storm clouds, 
Reardon thinks it may be that society will re-learn the 
lesson that “home = neighborhood.” The excesses of the 
housing market caused people to lose sight of that fact, 
transforming the equation into home = ATM as people 
looked for quick profits they had not earned. 
Homeownership can be an asset building strategy for low and moderate income people only if the 
value of homes remains strong. The foreclosure crisis is a reminder of this basic truth and a signal 
that is time to return, as NHS Chicago has done, to linking the value of housing assets to the 
neighborhoods in which they are located. 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. Neighborhood institutions such as the St. Nicholas Church are often the heart and soul of 
communities. They give the community an identity, and help define and articulate its values. 
They also expedite access to community residents who share a common commitment to 
something besides their own home or interests. As a result, they make a great starting point for 
organizing efforts. 
2. NHS Chicago did not impose a pre-conceived notion on the neighborhood of what should 
happen. Instead staff met with and listened to residents and community leaders, letting the 
definition of the problem, along with the solutions to them, flow up from the residents.  
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Vacant, deteriorated buildings are a 
chronic problem in neighborhoods. 
The foreclosure crisis makes this 
much worse; receivership is a 
strategy to expedite the repair or 
demolition of these buildings. 
Because the receiver lien supersedes 
all other liens except taxes, investors 
pay attention when their property 
goes into receivership.  
 
NHS of Chicago Uses Receivership to Rid Neighborhoods of Problem Properties 
 
Moderate Price Increase/Foreclosures Spiking 
 
 
CDCs have long grappled with how to motivate owners 
of problem properties to fix up or sell. Units that are 
vacant and boarded, with flaking paint and trash strewn 
lawns, drive down property values and invite vandalism. 
Vacant units threaten the financial health of 
homeowners who are not yet in trouble, and limit their 
options should they need to refinance. As a result, tried 
and true revitalization policies always call for identifying and remediating problem properties. 
 
The foreclosure crisis is creating problem properties in neighborhoods across the country. Where 
there might once have been just a few deteriorated buildings in a multi-block area, suddenly there 
may be one or two on every block. With the housing market slumping it is hard for property owners 
to sell, and they may not have savings or the ability to borrow money to repair them. In the past 
such properties were often owned by investors from outside the community, but increasingly they 
are bank-owned or in the foreclosure process. 
 
Working closely with the City of Chicago and the courts, NHS of Chicago, a member of the 
NeighborWorks® network, has found a way to ensure that problem properties are dealt with 
promptly, limiting the damage they can do in neighborhoods. The program is generally known as 
receivership but in Chicago they call it the Troubled Building Initiative 2, or TBI2.   
 
“Receivership as a statute has been on the books for 20 years” explains Floyd Gardner, Deputy 
Director of Single Family Housing for NHS of Chicago. “But it has mostly been applied to 
buildings with five or more units. Four years ago, we went to the City and asked if we could serve 
as the receiver for properties with fewer than five units.” The city agreed, and the first year they 
handled just 26 properties. But over the next three years an additional 229 buildings ended up in 
receivership with NHS.  
 
About 85 percent of the properties NHS serves as receiver for are already in Chicago’s Demolition 
Court. Properties end up in Demolition Court when they have very serious code violations and the 
property owner has ignored the Code Enforcement Office’s notices to improve. It used to be that 
owners could stall the Court for years by legal maneuvering, to the endless frustration of both the 
judges, the city, NHS, and neighborhood residents. Those days are gone. 
 
This is because the receiver’s lien supersedes any other 
lien except taxes. Suddenly, investors who thought they 
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Receivership can force a dialogue 
with property owners who might 
have avoided it otherwise; frequently, 
they come to regard NHS as a source 
of assistance, not the “enforcer”.   
could delay for years before making improvements are forced to act more quickly because their own 
investment is at risk. In its role as receiver NHS may simply do a quick study of the property, 
remediate an issue that is causing imminent harm (repair a collapsing porch, for example), or do a 
more in-depth study to compare the after rehab value with the cost to repair. Ultimately, NHS can 
recommend to the court whether the property is worth repairing or if it should be demolished. It 
very seldom comes to that; of the 255 properties NHS has served as receiver for in the last four 
years only 20 have gone to this stage.  Most property owners step in earlier in the process to make 
the necessary repairs or resolve the issue in some other way. 
The judges in Demolition Court are very enthusiastic about TBI2 because it has been so effective at 
moving along cases that had clogged up the court’s system for years. They have become much more 
aggressive at using the threat of receivership to jar owners into action.  
 
NHS likes the program because at long last it has a lever to budge problem property owners. 
Gardner thinks that this program would work well in just about any densely populated area, even if 
only a few are deteriorated. In other words, its success does not necessarily depend on volume. If a 
community has only a couple of blighted properties that are blocking revitalization efforts, a 
receivership program gives CDCs the tools to improve them. 
 
Serving in an enforcement role is an unusual role for CDCs, and some might shy away from it for 
fear of bad press. Yet Gardner insists this has not been an issue for NHS of Chicago. One of the 
reasons for this is that all of the communication to the property owner comes from the Code 
Enforcement office or the circuit court judges. NHS merely carries out the edicts.  
 
It helps also that NHS does not view itself as “the 
enforcer”, preferring instead to develop a partnership 
with the property owner to resolve the problem. In 
some cases, this might mean that owners do the work 
themselves; when this occurs, NHS vouches for them 
in court and asks that they be discharged as receiver. 
Owners are also referred to a NHS of Chicago 
neighborhood office for help in accessing financial or technical assistance that might be available. 
Somewhat surprisingly, NHS has found that property owners are sometimes glad when NHS takes 
over and renovates the property. These owners may have been stuck because income or credit issues 
prevented them from borrowing money, or the unit was in such disrepair it could not be used as 
collateral. When NHS gets the property in receivership and brings it up to standards, the unit may 
have enough value that the owner can refinance and pay off the liens. Generally, owners are more 
likely to cure liens that are less than $25,000.   
 
NHS also takes a softer approach when there is an owner-occupant involved. “From a practical 
standpoint, while the court allows us to go in and do what needs to be done, we can’t bar owners 
from entering their own property. It’s a win-win when they see that NHS can be a tool for helping 
them keep their building,” says Gardner. 
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TBI2 pays for itself. The City of Chicago allocates $2 million from its CDBG funds for the program 
each year. NHS can also bill for its time spent in court, doing feasibility studies, and in managing 
any work that is done (NHS does not itself carry out the repairs). To operate the program NHS 
employs a Program Manager, a Project Assistant who goes to the court dates and prepares the 
feasibility studies, and a Construction and Project Manager to manage sub-contracts such as for 
cleaning, tree or brush removal, writing up the scope of work, or overseeing general contractors 
who handle the actual construction. 
 
Funds come from owners’ repayment of the liens, or from the proceeds of the sale if the property 
goes to foreclosure.  
 
Gardner thinks that TBI2 will be an important tool in stabilizing neighborhoods hard hit by 
foreclosures. NHS has already cleared the pipeline of properties that had been clogging the 
Demolition Court’s system for several years. As a result, properties can move through the court into 
receivership within a matter of months. Since circuit court judges are utilizing the receivership 
option more aggressively NHS is under contract to act as receiver for up to 150 badly deteriorated 
properties next year, but it may do more. To help manage the volume Gardner is looking for other 
nonprofit partners to train as receivers.  
 
The ability to expedite the demolition or repair of foreclosed and deteriorated buildings that would 
otherwise drag down property values will be good news for Chicago neighborhoods in the years to 
come. 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. Most cities have receivership laws. NHS of Chicago took a tool that had been on the books for 
years and applied it to 1-4 unit buildings that had troubled its neighborhoods for years.  
2. NHS tries hard to avoid an adversarial relationship with property owners whose buildings are in 
receivership. The goal, after all, is to deal with the problem property, not to simply punish the 
property owner. By helping property owners meet their goals of either repairing or disposing of 
their buildings NHS can become their unexpected ally rather than simply being the enforcer. 
3. By creating strong partnerships with the city code enforcement office and the courts NHS has 
positioned itself to rid Chicago neighborhoods of problem properties. The program covers its 
costs, and volume is large enough that NHS is seeking other nonprofit partners to help serve as 
receivers.  
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Before and after photos of 7013 S. Eggleston in the Auburn Gresham/Englewood neighborhood in 
Chicago. Before entering the TBI2 program the vacant property had multiple code violations and 
was used by area gangs. NHS acquired the home, rehabbed it, and sold it to a first time homebuyer. 
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Vista del Sol Home 
NHS of Phoenix Purchases Distressed Subdivisions at Fire Sale Prices 
 
Steep Increase in Housing Values/Sharp (30% -50% Decline) 
 
When Doug Parker proposed to his board that they acquire a 21 lot, partially built subdivision in 
south Phoenix he met with a chilly reception. The board had good reason to be skeptical. The 
luckless developers had managed to sell only one of the seven completed units before the housing 
market crashed. The remaining houses had been vandalized for their copper and fixtures. There 
were over 550 foreclosed properties in the surrounding blocks, and the City of Phoenix was seeing 
foreclosure rates as high as 1,000 a week. Nearby properties that had sold for over $200,000 in 2006 
had lost more than a third of their value, and it was not clear whether the market had bottomed out. 
The construction lender was foreclosing and wanted $1.25 million; the subdivision carried a total of 
$2.8 million in debt. 
 
Parker is Director of Real Estate Development for NHS of Phoenix, a NeighborWorks® 
organization. He argued that purchasing Vista del Sol met all three criteria for NHS’ “triple bottom 
line”. It was a good fit with NHS’ mission to help low and moderate income families purchase good 
quality homes. It would revitalize a distressed neighborhood. And with careful planning NHS could 
earn a developer fee from the sale of the homes. After lengthy discussion the board agreed to the 
purchase with one condition; Parker had to convince the construction lender to reduce the price by 
$300,000.  
 
The bank jumped at the offer. It 
never took possession of the 
property, and NHS bought it at the 
foreclosure sale for the pre-
negotiated price of $950,000. 
 
When developers planned the Vista 
Del Sol subdivision they designed 
homes with an attractive finish that 
would appeal to a higher end buyer. 
Granite countertops, two bathrooms, 
polished concrete floors, high 
ceilings, and two-car garages are 
amenities not typically found in most low-moderate income housing. Their energy efficiency is also 
better than average, with 2x6 construction that is not the norm in Phoenix, and energy saving 
appliances. 
 
Parker and his board gambled that this extra quality would give them an edge in the market over 
comparably priced units. So far this gamble appears to be paying off. Initially, NHS projected 
conservatively that they would sell only one unit every two months, but in the first few months they 
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In this volatile market it is critical that 
CDCs purchasing bank REO manage 
their investment risk in several 
different ways, starting with buying 
properties at below market prices. The 
starting point should not be what the 
banks hope to get for their REO, but 
what CDCs can afford to pay given 
their goals of affordable housing and 
sustainable homeownership.  
sold three and have two more under contract. At the rate they are going, they will sell out a year 
ahead of schedule. 
 
Parker took several other steps to manage NHS’ investment risk:  
• He sold four of the lots to Habitat, who was delighted to buy lots near the city center for one-
third less than they had been paying for land in the outskirts of the city;  
• If they needed to in order to move them, he reserved the option to sell units to above income 
homeowners at market rates; 
• While NHS normally markets available units internally to families that have come through its 
homebuyer education program, Parker hired a real estate agent so the properties could be listed 
on the MLS;  
• He negotiated interest-free construction loans from the City of Phoenix’s Housing Department; 
• He sought partnerships with private developers to build out the vacant lots; 
• NHS had the option of land banking some of the vacant lots to wait until the market improved. 
 
The early signs are that Vista del Sol will be a successful project for NHS of Phoenix, and credit is 
due to both the staff and the board. Parker says that the board formed a Real Estate Committee to 
work more closely with staff in designing the project, which provided them with expert guidance. 
One member was a former developer who helped them think through all the potential costs and 
hazards of buying a half-built subdivision. Another board member was acquainted with the 
president of the bank that held the original construction loan on the subdivision, which facilitated 
the negotiation of the final sales price. For added perspective and strategy they also consulted with 
bankers and other professionals who had been through Phoenix’s last real estate collapse. 
 
While the Vista del Sol development has not been error free, the mistakes so far have been 
relatively minor, and because the initial pro forma was so conservative they have been able to 
absorb cost overruns and still turn a tidy profit. One error was overlooking the construction of walls 
around the backyards, which can run between $3,000 and $5,000 a lot. The walls are viewed as 
necessities by homeowners, so NHS has had to add them in. 
 
Parker is already out looking for distressed properties to 
purchase at foreclosure auction, or from lenders that 
have already repossessed them. He is even exploring 
buying promissory notes in first position that would 
allow NHS to foreclose on subdivisions. He is 
negotiating for funding for this from Neighborhood 
Housing Services of America (NHSA)-CDFI. 
 
To protect against further declines in the housing prices, 
in future deals NHS will negotiate a price that is 10% 
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less than the bottom of the market. In addition, to be considered for purchase subdivisions must: 
 
• Be single-family only (no multi-family), with a preference for those with at least some of the 
homes substantially completed; 
• Have fully developed infrastructure (no raw land); 
• Be in a sustainable location within 20 minutes of downtown Phoenix, with a preference for 
subdivisions in South Phoenix or other first-ring suburbs; 
• Be able to sell at a base price of $130,000 to $150,000 (affordable to families at 60 to 80% of 
area median income); 
• Have gone through foreclosure (or if a promissory note, NHS must be able to foreclose); 
• Be eligible for conventional financing. 
 
The housing bust in Phoenix is returning some sanity to a market that had gotten completely out of 
control. “Homes are affordable again in Phoenix without crazy loans” says Parker. With careful 
planning, nonprofit CDCs can use the market downturn to promote sustainable homeownership by 
helping low and moderate income first-time buyers get into energy efficient homes, in central 
locations, at a cost they can afford.  
 
Best Practices  
1. Decisions were made with guidance from board members with expertise in real estate finance 
and development. This helped structure a business deal that was sound even in a volatile market. 
Involvement of all NHS staff ensured that the plan received scrutiny for its back end 
affordability and marketability as well. 
2. NHS was well capitalized. Through a fortuitous sale of a large multi-family project at the height 
of the market (2006), it had a very healthy balance sheet which allowed it to negotiate excellent 
terms on debt and to absorb losses (if necessary.) 
3. NHS went into the deal with some clear exit strategies in the event that the project ran into 
trouble. These included sharing risk (e.g., by selling lots to Habitat), and preserving flexibility 
(such as land banking vacant lots or selling units to higher income families) in order to ensure 
that they turned a profit. 
4. Using its experience with the Vista del Sol subdivision, NHS created a “profile for success” that 
will guide its search and decision making around acquiring other subdivisions.  
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Some people in Cleveland, which is 
staggering under an onslaught of 
foreclosures, like to say that they 
have been hit by “Hurricane Greed”. 
Frank Ford of NPI prefers to 
compare it to a tsunami, which has 
successive (but distinct) waves of 
damage. 
A vacant, boarded Cleveland house with aluminum siding stripped. The 
handwritten message to would-be vandals, scrawled on the plywood, 
reads “No Copper or  Plumbing! Thanks a lot.” 
Neighborhood Progress Inc. Combines an Early Warning System, Strategically 
Targeted Rehab, and a Policy Reform Agenda to Combat Cleveland’s 
“Foreclosure Tsunami” 
 
Rapid Increase in Housing Prices/Steep housing Price Declines, Regional Economic 
Depression 
 
In 2004 Frank Ford, Senior Vice-President for Research and Development at Neighborhood 
Progress Inc., warned his board that there were early signs of a growing foreclosure problem in 
Cleveland and Cuyahoga County.  Ford estimated that the city’s community development 
corporations could collectively produce about 700 units a year. If he was right about the foreclosure 
problem, it could overwhelm the system’s capacity to respond.  
 
Ford was right. Foreclosure filings in the city and county, 
which had averaged about 3,000 a year in 1995, doubled in 
2000, and doubled again by 2005. In 2008 the region is on 
track to reach 15,000 filings, roughly half of which are in 
Cleveland. In August the Cleveland Plain Dealer estimated 
property values in some parts of the city had plummeted as 
much as 70%. Virtually every neighborhood has been 
affected, though some are harder hit than others.  
 
Natural disaster analogies abound; in Cleveland people like to say that they have been hit by 
“Hurricane Greed”. Ford himself prefers to think of it as a tsunami, because after the first big wave 
there can be later surges which are almost as damaging. He identifies three such surges in 
Cleveland: 
 
1. The foreclosures that empty units 
and leave them vacant. 
2. Ripple effects resulting from the 
abandonment of units. Within a 
couple of weeks of being vacated, 
houses are ransacked for their 
valuable copper plumbing and 
wiring, and their aluminum siding 
stripped. Vandals, of course, wreak 
enormous damage on the units in the 
course of stripping them. In many 
cases, if the water has not been shut 
off the broken pipes pump water 
into the basements, damaging the 
units still further. 
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With thousands of units foreclosed 
and abandoned, NPI realized that 
any effort to reclaim units would 
have to build strategically on 
pockets of strength, in 
neighborhoods where there had 
already been significant 
investment. 
Quite aside from the damage to the individual units, the asset base in Cleveland and the 
surrounding county has seriously eroded. This in turn will devastate communities when they 
update their valuations for tax purposes. Municipal and county governments, as well as school 
systems are likely to see strong downward pressures on their budgets in coming years. 
 
3. An influx of out-of-town real estate speculators eager to capitalize on the housing bust, 
who have the ability to buy large blocks of REO inventory from banks and re-sell them, with 
only modest improvements, to unsuspecting buyers.  
 
Neighborhood Progress Inc. (NPI) is a local housing intermediary based in Cleveland and funded by 
Cleveland Foundation, Enterprise Community Partners and the George Gund Foundation. NPI 
supports the work of approximately 14 Cleveland CDCs through grants and technical assistance. 
 
Faced with thousands of foreclosed and abandoned units, with thousands more moving through the 
pipeline, NPI and its partners struggled to find a response. They wanted to send a message of hope; 
to show that something could be done to stop the bleeding. At the same time, they had to do more 
than renovate random units; a scattershot approach would simply be a waste of time and resources.  
 
They decided instead to do a small pilot, 50 units, in six 
neighborhoods that were already part of NPI’s Strategic 
Investment Initiative (SII). SII, started in 2004, provided 
additional funding and technical assistance to a handful of 
neighborhoods to help them become “regionally 
competitive neighborhoods of choice”. The original concept 
was to help these neighborhoods successfully complete a 
catalytic, anchor project of some scale that would stimulate 
market rejuvenation. Each neighborhood identified a 10-
block area surrounding the anchor project which would be the focus of additional efforts to improve 
the appearance and build community pride. The 50 units in NPI’s new project would be scattered 
within the 10 block focus areas of the six neighborhoods. Ohio Housing Finance Agency, Living 
Cities, and the City of Cleveland committed to providing gap financing, averaging $40,000/unit, 
that would allow the CDCs to properly renovate the units and still sell them at affordable prices to 
low and moderate income buyers. 
 
With the target areas established NPI next thought about how to support and strengthen the 
residents who were still there. Studies showed that foreclosure counseling was effective about half 
the time in helping homeowners who made and kept their appointments avoid foreclosure. The 
problem was, the vast majority of homeowners in foreclosure were not even asking for help. Of 
14,000 Cleveland and Cuyahoga homeowners in foreclosure in 2007, only 2,000 made and kept 
appointments; of those half, or 1,000, retained their units. Ford says NPI and its partners started 
wondering “what if we could find out who is heading for foreclosure and stop it?” They needed an 
early warning system that could work on an individual property level.  
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The early warning system allows 
NPI and its partners to identify 
homeowners most at-risk of losing 
their homes to foreclosure; those 
where the foreclosure was still 
pending, who had received a 
mortgage from a known subprime 
lender, and whose loan was 
adjustable rate. 
The foreclosure crisis has forced NPI 
to consider a new role as change 
agent; at the local, city and county 
and statewide levels.    
 
They turned to Case-Western Reserve University, which for several years had been working with 
NPI to develop a database, called “NEO CANDO”, which combined data from a variety of sources 
into one, parcel-based system. CWRU had already pulled in county auditor data, foreclosure filings, 
sheriff’s sale notices, City of Cleveland code enforcement data, and regional water and sewer data. 
The project got a major lift when First American Title 
offered to supply data on which homeowners had 
adjustable rate mortgages and when they were due to re-
set. NPI and its partners chose three major criteria to 
identify homeowners at serious risk of foreclosure: 
1) Cases where the foreclosure was still pending, and the 
water in the unit was on (it was still occupied) 
2) Homeowners who had received a loan from HUD’s 
published list of subprime mortgage lenders 
3) Homeowners who had obtained adjustable rate 
mortgages 
 
In the initial pilot, NPI shared these data with its six CDCs, who were responsible for doing the 
outreach to homeowners. It is fair to say that these CDCs generally did not have a background in 
community organizing, and lacked some capacity in carrying out this assignment. While 17 
foreclosures were averted, Ford was dissatisfied with this result and thought that with some more 
assistance they could do better.  
To improve outreach results, in the next phase NPI will contract with Empowering and 
Strengthening Ohio’s People (ESOP) to help with outreach to homeowners. ESOP has a strong 
community organizing background, and through concerted, sometimes in-your-face community 
action had negotiated fair lending agreements with a number of lenders and servicers. These 
agreements allow them to halt foreclosure proceedings by faxing in a document, and give them 
direct access to lender and servicers’ senior level executives who have the authority to approve a 
modification or workout plan. This greatly improves ESOP’s ability to intervene successfully to 
avert foreclosures. 
Ford says they will also use a longer time horizon in looking at the ARM data. Initially they asked 
First American for just the next few months’ worth of data, which was too short a time frame. Now 
they have asked for data through 2009, which will give them more time to identify and contact at-
risk homeowners. 
 
This is new ground for NPI, and for its CDC partners. From 
its inception NPI had focused on bricks and mortar, leaving 
community organizing and advocacy to other groups. Also, 
for many years NPI and most other Cleveland area housing 
organizations had emphasized increasing production of new 
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units, to such an extent that few CDCs even have the capacity to handle rehab of existing properties. 
In the current foreclosure crisis, NPI has had to redefine its role. It is embracing (and funding) 
community outreach efforts such as its foreclosure prevention initiatives. It is also working on the 
city, county, and state levels to advocate for policy and systems level changes that will protect 
homeowners and neighborhoods, and prevent future (manmade) disasters such as this one. 
 
 
Best Practices 
1. NPI piggybacked on its existing Strategic Investment Initiative to help target its work in 
neighborhoods. This helped protect current investment and assets, and ensured their work would 
have a more visible impact. 
2. Sophisticated use of technology and data gave Ford and his colleagues the ability to pinpoint 
homeowners at higher risk for foreclosure and reach out to them before it happened. Since 
studies show that distressed homeowners often do not call for help, this early warning system is 
a tremendous boost to prevention efforts. 
3. CDCs that have focused on “bricks and mortar” over community outreach and organizing will 
need help adding this to their skill base. NPI’s contract with ESOP will help the six participating 
CDCs learn how to improve the effectiveness of their outreach to at-risk homeowners. 
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Vacant, boarded up units drag down 
adjacent property values, putting the 
rest of the neighborhood at risk. 
Where are the buyers for these 
bargains? 
Self-Help:  National Initiative to Bring Lease-Purchase to Scale 
 
Secondary Market Initiative to Help Absorb Excess Inventory 
 
Nonprofit community development corporations face a conundrum. Prices are falling in virtually all 
markets, and increasingly there are units available at 
prices low and moderate income people can afford. 
Neighborhoods desperately need homeowners to take over 
the vacant stock which is dragging down values and 
becoming attractive to investors looking for cheap rentals. 
Nonprofits have the capital and expertise to buy, renovate, 
and re-sell single family homes. But where are the buyers?  
 
Many of today’s community development leaders experienced the housing downturn in the early 
1990s that was caused by the savings and loan crisis. They know that housing markets are cyclical; 
this current market correction is painful, and seems endless. Yet in many markets prices are hitting 
bottom and before long they will begin edging back up. It will never cost less, in subsidy terms, to 
help low-income families buy their first home, as prices have dropped. Now is the right time to help 
the next generation of buyers. 
  
This awareness is behind Self-Help’s effort to develop a national lease-purchase initiative that will 
help buyers move into houses and, within a one to five year period, improve their credit and savings 
to the point where they can purchase the property. Local nonprofits will buy single-family 
properties using a Fannie Mae mortgage product, and lease them to families who are not yet 
mortgage-ready but can get there within the five-year time frame. Self-Help will purchase those 
loans, and the tenants can assume the mortgage when they meet predefined requirements. 
 
The lease-purchase concept is not new. It 
emerged in the wake of the savings and 
loan crisis in the early 1990s, at a time 
when there was also a glut of vacant 
units at a reasonable price and a dearth of 
eligible buyers. In recent years, lease-
purchase has faded from view because 
subprime lending offered non-
conventional borrowers another entry 
point into the market. Now that credit 
has tightened, lease purchase is once 
again emerging as an attractive 
alternative. Self-Help, a North Carolina-
based nonprofit that works at the local 
and national levels to create ownership and economic opportunity, is leading the charge. 
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A unit in the Peachtree Hills subdivision.
 
“For many years Self-Help has acted as a secondary market for affordable housing loans across the 
country” explains Vanita Kalra, a Real Estate Associate at Self-Help. “Through a partnership with 
Fannie and the Ford Foundation, we have done about $4.5 billion in loans, serving 50,000 families. 
That’s the way Self-Help brings its mission to scale. By making the permanent financing easier to 
obtain, we think we can help bring the lease-purchase program to scale in a way it has never been 
before.” While much of the work- and control- of the lease-purchase program will remain in the 
local communities, by providing the permanent financing using a Fannie Mae product Self-Help can 
jumpstart creation of new programs. Self-Help is negotiating agreements with financial institutions 
to do lease-purchase loans in a number of communities, but it will also work with nonprofits to 
bring local lenders to the table. 
 
A pilot is currently under way in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, where Self-Help’s own CDC operates. The 
city of Charlotte is anxious to stabilize a relatively 
new subdivision (Peachtree Hills) that has been hit 
hard by foreclosures. The city is working with Self-
Help CDC and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing 
Partnership (CMHP) to create a comprehensive 
approach to stabilize the community. Peachtree Hills 
was started in 2003 and comprises 147 units, 
although not all of the units were built before the 
market slumped. As of January 2008 there were 
about 40 vacancies, and at least 42 of the properties  
had been foreclosed on or owned by a bank since 2003. While there are homeowners who take 
evident pride in their homes, they are losing ground to vandalism, rising crime, and a continued 
erosion of the homeowner base. “Copper miners”, thieves who strip valuable copper wiring from 
homes, are breaking into the vacant units. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg police responded 360 times 
to calls in Peachtree during the last year, averaging almost one visit a day. Given its current 
reputation, few families are interested in buying there and it is threatening to spiral out of control. 
 
In the pilot, the Self-Help CDC will purchase up to 25 vacant units using Self-Help’s lease-purchase 
product. The CDC will hold and manage them until a buyer is able to assume them. The CDC will 
do minor rehab, mostly new paint and carpeting, to make the units more attractive, and it will use a 
network of counseling agencies and realtors across the city to attract both lease-purchasers and 
mortgage-ready buyers. CMHP, a NeighborWorks® organization and HUD-approved housing 
counseling agency, will provide financial counseling and education to lease-purchasers to prepare 
them for homebuying. The city of Charlotte will make infrastructure improvements to enhance the 
subdivision’s curb appeal and to provide support to the emerging homeowners association to 
organize the residents. Finally, the CDC has hired a property management firm to manage the units 
during the lease period. 
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Lease-purchase may be a useful 
strategy for nonprofits who are sitting 
on new inventory that was built near 
the market peak, and who are facing  
both high carrying costs and losses on 
the sale of the units. 
Good prospects for the lease-purchase program will be individuals or families with at least a 12 
month work history, and sufficient income to afford the lease payment. Initially credit will not be a 
factor, because over the next one to five years they will work to repair their credit and build their 
savings. A portion of tenants’ monthly lease payment will be set aside in an account to build 
savings towards downpayment and closing costs. Once tenants’ credit scores improve and other 
requirements are met they will be eligible to assume the loan from the Self-Help CDC.  
 
While piloting this approach in Charlotte, Self-Help 
is already seeking other partners in cities across the 
country. “We know it will be difficult for 
communities to absorb stock in the near turn, which 
makes lease-purchase a great option” says Self-
Help’s Kalra. “We see this as another tool in the 
toolbox for CDCs; it isn’t the only answer, but 
under the right scenarios it can really help.” This 
may the right option for non-profits currently holding new inventory that was under construction 
just prior to the peak of the market. With prices tumbling, buyers are few and far between. Not only 
are nonprofits potentially taking a loss on the sales, they are carrying the full project cost with no 
relief in sight. A lease-purchase program can be a good strategy to fill those units and create a 
revenue stream from rents.  
 
Self-Help is seeking local partners with the capacity to acquire, renovate, and re-sell single family 
properties, as well as expertise in locating and counseling prospective lease-purchase participants. 
Aside from ensuring local groups have the ability to deliver qualified buyers at the end of the lease 
period, Self-Help has no prescribed model for how local groups should run their programs. They 
can purchase units in scattered sites, or in clusters as in the Peachtree Hills subdivision. They can 
focus on units in need of substantial rehabilitation, or target homes in newer subdivisions. “It’s all 
according to what makes sense for their local market, and what they feel comfortable taking on,” 
Kalra says. 
 
The lease-purchase program will not be for everyone, but it could be a useful strategy for those 
concerned about absorbing excess inventory. For more information, contact Vanita Kalra at 
Vanita.Kalra@self-help.org . 
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Best Practices 
 
1. The lease-purchase concept has been around for years, but relatively few nonprofits have 
operated one at any scale. By using a standardized, Fannie Mae mortgage product and making it 
available nationwide, Self-Help is removing one of the obstacles to nonprofits interested in 
adding this program to their programming. 
2. Self-Help recognizes that nonprofits will need to vary their lease-purchase program design in 
order to meet their local customs, practice or funding. It is not prescribing how the program 
should operate, but simply requiring that there is a plan in place to help lease-purchase tenants 
prepare to assume the mortgage within a five-year time frame. In order for tenants to assume the 
loan they will also have to meet pre-defined criteria. 
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HUD’s Asset Control Area 
(ACA) program is a partnership 
with communities to use FHA 
foreclosed inventory to 
strengthen neighborhoods. 
Units are acquired at a 50 
percent discount and sold to 
low and moderate income 
homeowners. 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center: Reclaiming Foreclosed Properties 
through the HUD ACA Program 
 
Moderate Home Price Increases from 2002-2006/Slow Decline in 2007-2008 
 
Communities struggling with high levels of FHA foreclosures may want to enroll in HUD’s Asset 
Control Area (ACA) program. ACA allows approved nonprofit organizations and local 
governments to buy foreclosed properties at a 50 percent discount. Once renovated, the properties 
must be sold to homeowners earning up to 115 percent of 
area median income. The nonprofit recoups its overhead 
and developer fee from the difference between the sale 
price and its costs, though it is limited to a maximum of 
15% of development costs. The program can be a 
powerful tool to build homeownership, upgrade the 
housing stock, and prevent foreclosed properties from 
being sold to investors. Managed correctly, it can easily 
cover expenses and provide a steady revenue stream. 
Operating within HUD’s program guidelines is tricky, 
however, and requires detailed knowledge of 
neighborhoods, local real estate markets, and scattered site single-family housing rehabilitation. 
 
David Sann, Director of Housing Development at Baltimore’s St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center, 
has the ACA program down to a science. “When you sign up for the ACA program HUD 
essentially draws a box around your target neighborhood” he explains. “You have to take every 
REO property within that box, no matter what its condition.” While the 50% discount may seem 
generous at the outset, properties needing substantial renovations can easily eat up that subsidy. The 
sale price is limited to the lower of 115 percent of total development costs or the after-rehab 
appraised value. Within that limit nonprofits must include all of their costs; rehab, insurance, fees, 
marketing, and their margin. The limit on buyers’ incomes restricts the market for the properties, 
and it can be challenging to find families who can meet the income requirements, have low debt 
loads, and whose credit is good. Properties that sit for months without a buyer eat into the profit 
margin. Sann sums it up this way; “HUD limits what you can earn, but not what you can lose.” 
 
The key to success in ACA, Sann believes, is to choose the 
right neighborhood in the first place. HUD only offers ACA 
as an option in designated revitalization areas that are 
characterized by low homeownership, low income, and high 
FHA foreclosure rates. Within those areas, nonprofits can 
negotiate to serve census block groups that fit their profile. 
 
Sann’s recipe for ACA success has three key ingredients:  the 
market for housing in the neighborhood, the price range, and 
Post-Foreclosure Community Stabilization Strategies: Case Studies and Early Lessons 
www.StableCommunities.org 
 
 52 
ACA works best in “mid-
range” neighborhoods with a 
solid housing demand, 
moderate (not too depressed) 
prices, and a modest, uniform 
housing stock.  
consistency of housing type. Belair-Edison, in northeast Baltimore, is one of Sann’s favorite ACA 
neighborhoods, because it has all three of these in abundance. A neighborhood of modest brick 
1920 -1950s era rowhouses, with Herring Run Park and other amenities nearby, Belair-Edison is 
attractive to buyers. Renovated homes there are likely to sell quickly, keeping carrying costs to a 
minimum.  
 
The homes’ modest size make them affordable to low and moderate income buyers. Since buyers’ 
incomes are capped, it is critical that prices be low enough for them to qualify without additional 
subsidies. In addition, HUD’s ACA 50 percent discount is less valuable when the market is 
depressed. For example, if the fair market value after rehab is $60,000, and St. Ambrose acquires it 
for $30,000, that leaves only about $30,000 to do all of the necessary renovations, cover soft costs, 
and extract a developer fee. Absent significant subsidies, there is no way to make the numbers work 
in depressed neighborhoods. 
 
Finally, the uniformity of the housing stock makes it easier to 
project and manage renovation costs. When all the units have a 
similar footprint and floor plan there are few surprises in what 
they will need in order to bring them up to standards. This also 
allows St. Ambrose to work at a larger scale. Under ordinary 
circumstances Sann says he and his two staff could acquire, 
renovate and sell 50 houses annually through the ACA program.  
 
While picking the right neighborhood is essential, having the right staff may be just as critical. 
Sann, in addition to serving as the Director of Housing, is a licensed real estate broker with 13 years 
of development experience. Through their in-house Charm City Realty brokerage St. Ambrose has 
access to the multiple listing service, which allows Sann to do extensive market research. Sann’s 
construction manager is also an architect, which lowers costs and improves project quality. The 
third staff person, the Marketing Coordinator, is also a licensed realtor with 17 years of experience 
working with homeowners in Baltimore housing markets. 
 
Sann admits that the ACA program has been a little more challenging in the current market. 
Baltimore did not see a huge run-up in housing prices, and its prices have adjusted downwards by 
only 10-15%. However, in recent years subprime borrowers bypassed FHA in favor of "exotic" 
mortgage instruments with fewer restrictions. Since use of FHA insurance was down generally, 
there have been fewer foreclosures coming through the ACA program. This year Sann estimates 
that his staff of three will acquire only 35 units, which is below their capacity. Now that the exotic 
mortgages are no longer available Sann believes use of FHA insurance will rebound. While no 
foreclosure is good for the family or the community, to the extent any occur it is preferable to have 
them come through the ACA program than to have to deal with a multitude of private investors. 
 
A bigger challenge is understanding where the market is going, and pricing units accordingly. 
Nonprofits always struggle with the vagaries of appraisals, which may use the wrong comparables, 
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not properly account for the cost of needed repairs, or give insufficient value to improvements. In a 
declining market, however, St. Ambrose’s risk is that it will acquire properties at a cost that is 
higher than what it can afford to renovate and sell them for eight months later. This eats into profit 
margins which were not robust to begin with. Again, Sann expects this will be sorted out as the 
market stabilizes. 
 
Managed carefully, Sann believes that the ACA program is a great tool 
for strengthening neighborhoods. Homes St. Ambrose renovates have 
new or updated kitchens, baths, heating systems, electric, plumbing, 
roofs, refinished hardwood floors or new wall-to-wall carpet, ceiling fans 
throughout the house and/or central air conditioning (sometimes both). 
Energy efficiency is improved through new storm doors, new 
replacement windows, and new Energy Star appliances: refrigerator, 
stove, built-in microwave, washer and dryer. Reasonably priced and 
tastefully finished, the homes are sold to low and moderate income 
buyers (averaging about 89% of area median.) Solid homes, sold to 
buyers who have completed homebuyer education workshops, means 
that the homeowners will be more successful over the long term. That’s good for the families, and 
good for neighborhoods as well. 
 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. HUD’s ACA program is not a “one size fits all” fix for any troubled neighborhoods. Rather, it 
works best in neighborhoods with a modest housing stock, where prices are not too depressed 
and there are homeowners who want to live there. Sann and his team have figured out the 
formula that works best in Baltimore, and apply that very carefully. 
2. Each member of St. Ambrose’s Housing Development team is able to play more than one role, 
which reduces cost, improves efficiencies, and strengthens their ability to analyze and respond 
to changing market conditions. 
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Focused community stabilization 
efforts require detailed 
neighborhood analysis and 
planning, and should be wary of 
adopting a “one size fits all” 
approach. 
United Housing, a Local Foundation, and University of Memphis’ CBANA Join 
Forces in Holistic Approach to Community Stabilization 
 
Moderate Home Price Increases from 2002-2006/Slow Decline in 2007-2008 
 
Memphis is a “big small town”, according to Dr. Phyllis Betts, Director of the Center for 
Community Building and Neighborhood Action (CBANA) at the University of Memphis (UM). 
With a population of about 674,000 Memphis is far from small, but what Betts means is that there is 
a relatively small community of housing and community development professionals who know each 
other and work together well. This has made it much easier to develop a comprehensive, holistic 
approach to community stabilization in Memphis. 
 
Memphis has not seen the rapid swings in housing 
prices found in other parts of the country. Increases 
ranged from 25 – 40 percent, and the downward 
adjustment has been only about 15 percent to date. 
Nevertheless, foreclosures rose steadily over the last 
five years, from about 8-10,000 notifications annually 
to a projected 14,000 in 2008. And vacant houses have 
been appearing on many neighborhood streets in 
sufficient numbers that local groups began to take 
notice.  
 
A local foundation (which prefers to remain anonymous) was willing to underwrite a 
comprehensive approach to stabilizing Memphis neighborhoods affected by foreclosure. Its staff 
contacted Betts to talk about harnessing CBANA’s talents and those of other University 
departments. Betts had been studying Memphis foreclosures for some time, and was involved in a 
number of citywide projects. Through CBANA, she could do GIS mapping at a block level to show 
foreclosures, homeownership rates, and problem properties, and overlay these with demographic 
data as well. She could also involve student interns to do a lot of the legwork. 
 
While Memphis is home to a number of groups offering homebuyer education and community-
based housing programs, the clear choice for coordinating the housing activity was United Housing, 
the local NeighborWorks® affiliate. United Housing was 
the only organization that had a citywide presence and the 
capacity to work with multiple partners. Tim Bolding, 
United Housing’s Executive Director, notes that since its 
inception in 1994 United Housing has renovated, built, or 
helped finance 1,450 single family units. Its three primary 
lines of business are homebuyer education, building and 
renovating housing, and second mortgage financing. 
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Identifying and building on existing 
community assets will allow United 
Housing and its partners to support 
investment that has already taken 
place, and build outward from these 
strong clusters. 
United Housing is also developing a new first mortgage product that will become the cornerstone of 
the community stabilization initiative in Memphis. 
 
The Memphis initiative is guided by some critical insights developed by Betts. While the 
foreclosure crisis is often viewed as being caused solely by greedy subprime lenders, Betts points 
out that in fact homeowners take diverse paths to foreclosure that demand different interventions. In 
the same vein, housing markets and neighborhood dynamics vary widely within cities. As a result, 
stabilizing housing markets and restoring value to homeownership will require a toolbox of 
neighborhood level and context-specific interventions, not a “one size fits all” approach.  
 
In Memphis, these insights have helped fashion an approach to community stabilization that uses 
data to drive decision making to develop strategies, and relies on a network of local organizations in 
implementing solutions that are the right “fit” with each neighborhood and its residents. With a 
background in Cultural Anthropology, Bolding is particularly well-equipped to work with a variety 
of groups to effect change that is locally defined and supported. 
 
United Housing plans to acquire vacant foreclosed 
properties, renovate them, and re-sell them to homebuyers. 
The goal is to complete 20-30 in the first year. The effort 
will begin with students in UM’s School of Urban Affairs 
and Public Policy completing detailed GIS maps of 
Memphis neighborhoods. The maps will identify roads, 
schools, and community assets such as parks or the offices 
of service providers. The maps will also geo-code properties that are owned or have been renovated 
by United Housing or another community groups. Identifying and building on existing community 
assets will support investment that has already taken place, and build outward from these strong 
clusters. For example, schools offer a natural focal point for communities. Bolding and foundation 
staff will meet with building principals to gain their cooperation in marketing properties to teachers 
and to families with school-age children who are a ready market for available homes 
 
Anthropology students at UM will reach out to neighborhood residents and leaders, and organize 
community meetings. Their insights and analysis will help inform the programs and strategies that 
will be implemented in the neighborhoods. UM 
Finance and Real Estate students will help 
Bolding sort through available foreclosed 
properties and determine which make most 
financial sense to acquire, renovate, and re-sell to 
homeowners.  
 
Bolding will draw on the strengths of local 
community partners, utilizing whatever strengths 
they have. For example, one CDC has its own 
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work crew. United Housing will contract with this group to inspect available units and draw up 
specifications. Construction management will be contracted out either to for-profit contractors or to 
CDCs. Other organizations offer financial literacy training, and will be instrumental in identifying 
and preparing new homebuyers for purchase. Bolding will use a MOU to clearly define roles and 
responsibilities. Foundation funds will help pay these local groups for their work. 
 
Bolding anticipates that in several of the target neighborhoods it will be relatively easy to produce 
units that sell for $60,000 - $70,000 after rehab. The plan is to acquire properties for $20,000, do 
roughly $20,000 in rehab, and sell them for $60,000. To help attract buyers and jump start their 
asset building, the foundation is requiring that the last $20,000 in value be captured in a second 
mortgage. This will be a zero percent deferred loan forgiven at the rate of 10 percent a year over a 
10-year term. 
 
Community organizations have long known that successful homeowners strengthen neighborhoods. 
The foreclosure crisis has reminded us that the reverse is also true; healthy neighborhoods are 
fundamental to building assets for homeowners. Memphis’ holistic approach to community 
stabilization will ensure that the needs of neighborhoods and homeowners will be balanced so that 
both are successful going forward.  
 
 
Best Practices 
 
1. The partnership between United Housing and the University of Memphis creates a great 
synergy. It brings new skills and capacity to focus on the foreclosure problem that United 
Housing could not provide on its own. GIS mapping at the parcel level, as well as analysis of 
cultural characteristics that should shape community outreach and organizing, will improve the 
likelihood that the effort will be successful. At the same time, United Housing has financial and 
technical skills that will be critical to coordinating the effort, and to the reclamation of 
abandoned units. 
2. Successful resolution of the foreclosure crisis in Memphis will require that all resources be 
brought to the table. Rather than creating “cookie cutter” roles that would exclude some 
organizations, United Housing will use whatever strengths nonprofits can offer. A 
Memorandum of Understanding will capture the roles these individual organizations will play.  
3. The Memphis initiative is built on an appreciation that “one size fits all” solutions for individual 
homeowners and for neighborhoods are unlikely to be successful. Just as individuals may take 
different paths to foreclosure that call for a different response, neighborhood housing markets 
have different dynamics that may require a variety of intervention strategies.  
 
 
